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Abstract 
This paper studies housing tenure and labour mobility using individual data from the ECHP 
for five European countries. First, the effect of housing tenure on the unemployed workers' 
labour mobility is studied using a discrete unemployment duration model with two alternative 
exits to employment, depending on whether they are associated with a residential change or 
not. Ownership is found to affect geographical mobility negatively. Second, the results are 
robust to potential endogeneity of the ownership status and institutional differences across 
countries. Third, post-unemployment wages are studied. We do not find any effects of the 
unemployment spell duration and the geographical mobility on wages after controlling for the 
self-selection bias.  
Keywords: Labour mobility, Housing tenure, Duration models, Self-selection bias, Wage 
equation. 
JEL classification: J61, R20, J31. 
 
 
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the impact of hous-
ing tenure on the unemployed workers’ geographical mobility decision in five European
countries, taking into account their institutional differences. To study the relationship
between housing tenure and labour mobility, I use a sample of unemployed family heads
from the European Community Household Panel (hereafter, ECHP) for the period,
1994-98.
Much empirical work has addressed the topics of mobility and housing tenure. In the
case of the UK, Hughes and McCormick (1981) and Henley (1998) find a negative impact
of social rented housing and ownership on migration, mainly from negative housing
equity. These studies as well as others, like Hughes and McCormick (1994) and Pissarides
and Wadsworth (1989), have found that geographical mobility does not respond to
regional economic conditions, such as high unemployment rates.
Unlike papers mentioned above, this paper addresses the issue of how the owner-
occupied housing may affect exits from unemployment negatively by making the home-
owners more reluctant to accept a job implying a residential change. The analysis is
carried out using microdata and only focuses on the unemployed workers’ geograph-
ical mobility decision, so the more natural way of implementing this study is to use
unemployment duration models with multiple transitions from unemployment. I focus
on the unemployed, since employed workers’ geographical mobility responds to different
factors, possibly related to their current job characteristics.
Other microdata studies like van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and Bo¨heim and
Taylor (1999) focus on other related issue of how home ownership and commuting affect
the employed workers’ job mobility decision in the Netherlands and the UK, respectively.
In small countries where regions are connected by high-speed trains and other very good
communications, commuting time becomes an important factor deterring from job mo-
bility and the negative effect of home ownership disappears. However, in large countries
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like Spain and Italy, where regions are not well-communicated with each other, the
structure of housing markets becomes an important factor explaining the geographical
mobility decision.
Housing and geographical mobility are also two important issues in Spain, given
the high unemployment and ownership rates, 15.2% and 83.4% in 1998 respectively,1
which are among the highest in the European Community. Empirical work studying the
response of mobility to differentials in regional labour markets in Spain can be found in
Bentolila and Dolado (1990), Bentolila (1997), Antol´ın and Bover (1997), and Bentolila
and Jimeno (1998). However, these authors do not study the effect of housing tenure
on the unemployed workers’ geographical mobility decision using microdata, possibly
due to the absence of a fixed panel that allows to study both topics in Spain until the
construction of the ECHP.
The interest in analysing housing tenure and labour decisions using the ECHP is
that this survey is close to a merge of a Labour Force Survey and a Family Expenditure
Survey; it provides more information for addressing both topics than any of either survey
separately. This allows the joint study of housing, residential and labour mobility, since
the survey keeps track of migrant households.
Moreover, the implementation of this survey in other European countries allows all
countries to be studied jointly. This introduces exogenous variation in the analysis of
housing and mobility, since the way in which individuals choose their housing tenure
depends greatly on the institutional characteristics prevailing in each country. This is
the main contribution of this paper to the studies of housing and labour markets.
The choice of housing tenure is predetermined to a large extent by the institutional
characteristics. As housing is a basic good, policy makers have generally tried to make
the access to a dwelling easier, by providing social rented housing and subsidies, and
1The harmonised unemployment and home ownership rates are constructed by Eurostat, using the
European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the European Community Household Panel (ECHP),
respectively.
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allowing tax reliefs if individuals rent a house. Home ownership has also been supported,
for instance through the interest relief in income taxes, the tax relief on maintenance
of the house, and the absence of taxes on imputed rents and on capital gains derived
from the sale of houses. Often, these policies have benefited one housing tenure more
than the other, resulting in the dominance of one housing tenure over the other in most
European countries.
The empirical study will focus on France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. This choice is based on the variation that these countries provide in the way
that their institutions promote the access to housing. That variation helps to explain
the link between home ownership and labour mobility observed in a country.
Using the information on the financial and housing markets in European countries
during the 1990s that Maclennan et al. (1998) collect, those five countries can be sorted
into two groups according to the relative importance of the two main types of housing
tenure: ownership and rental. A first set is formed by Germany and France, in which a
high percentage of households lives in rental housing (private or social accommodation),
62% and 38% of the housing stock, respectively. A second group includes Spain, Italy
and the United Kingdom, where ownership is clearly the preferred alternative; 78%
of the housing stock in Spain is occupied through ownership, and 68% and 67% in
Italy and in the UK, respectively. In these countries, the yearly inter-regional mobility
rates as a percentage of population are: 1.23% and 1.07% in Germany and France,
0.5% and 0.56% in Italy and Spain, and finally 1.58% in the UK (1993 data). Thus,
it seems that in the aggregates there exists a negative relationship between ownership
and inter-regional mobility rates in these countries, except for the UK. Regarding the
unemployment rate, there is also a negative relationship between unemployment and
inter-regional mobility rates and a positive one between ownership and unemployment
rates, since Germany and Spain have the lowest and the highest unemployment rates in
1993, 7.6% and 22.2%, respectively. Meanwhile, the unemployment rates in France, the
3
BANCO DE ESPAÑA    11      DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
UK and Italy are 11.7%, 10.3% and 10.2%, respectively.2
The empirical model of housing tenure and labour mobility that I use is a discrete
unemployment duration model with two alternative exits to employment, depending
on whether they are associated with a residential change or not. These transitions to
employment are assumed to follow a multinomial logit specification. Using this sample
of unemployment spells, I also investigate the main determinants of the housing tenure
status by taking into account the institutional differences across countries. The owner-
ship status and labour mobility are assumed to be both correlated through unobserved
heterogeneity.
Finally, I also analyse the reemployment wage that individuals obtain when they
leave their unemployment spell. Policy-makers should foster housing policies that en-
courage geographical mobility if this helps the unemployed workers to obtain a job with
better work conditions. In particular, I study two aspects: first, whether the duration
of the unemployment spell influences the attained wage level and, second, whether geo-
graphical mobility helps individuals to obtain a higher wage after leaving unemployment
than the one they would have obtained in their local area.3 First, I estimate the mean
of the wage distribution by controlling for self-selection bias; and second, I estimate
both transitions to employment and the mean of the wage distribution jointly using the
generalised method of moments, in order to obtain consistent and more efficient esti-
mates under the existence of self-selection bias. The bias arises due to the fact that a
subsample of individuals decide to remain unemployed when the wage offers they receive
are lower than their reservation wage.
The main empirical result is that owners are more reluctant to move than renters;
and this result is reinforced when I allow for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
2Source: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 69, 2001.
3It is not clear in which direction the wage level should move when the unemployed migrate due to
job-related reasons. It depends on whether the reservation wage for accepting a job in other region is
higher than that in their local area or not, which is itself related to their expectations. This issue will
be explained in detail in the following sections.
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So, for fostering geographical mobility, policy-makers should encourage housing policies
making private rental more attractive. As expected, in the local labour market owners
behave in a similar way to renters. We do not find any effects of the unemployment
spell durations and the geographical mobility on reemployment wages.
The rest of paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical duration
model of housing tenure and labour mobility and the results. Section 3 addresses the
potential endogeneity of the ownership status by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity
in both transitions to employment. Section 4 studies the wage attained by individuals
when they leave unemployment through one of these two alternatives: exit to a job
associated with a residential change and exit to a job without residential change. The
former alternative is identified as a case of geographical mobility in the empirical model.
Finally, Section 5 summarises the conclusions.
5
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2 An empirical model of housing tenure and labour
mobility
In this section, I try to find out whether housing tenure affects the unemployed
individuals’ geographical mobility decision, in particular, their incentives to accept a
job in an area that implies a residential change. It is thought that owners are more
reluctant to move to other region to work than renters, since they have higher moving
costs.
The empirical study is to test the two main predictions about how housing tenure
affects the individuals’ labour decisions derived in Barcelo´ (2005), for a sample of un-
employed family heads in five European countries. For this purpose, differences in the
institutional characteristics across countries are captured in two different ways: first,
I include country dummies in order to find out whether these differences can be iden-
tified in the sample and afterwards, I replace these dummies by indicators of relevant
characteristics of housing and labour markets affecting the labour mobility decision.
Barcelo´ (2005) develops a two-region model of job search in which individuals take
three decisions jointly each period: the choice of housing tenure, the region in which to
live and the acceptance or rejection of the received wage offers. In this model, owners are
less willing to accept a job in other region for two reasons. First, individuals are assumed
to obtain housing services more cheaply if they live in an owned house than in a rented
house. Second, individuals who become owners by buying a dwelling have to incur some
transaction costs at the moment that this purchase takes place (transaction tax, stamp
duty, and so on). These two assumptions make owners have a higher reservation wage
than renters for accepting a job in another region. Thus, the probability of geographical
mobility will be more reduced for this housing tenure type. However, the behaviour
in the labour market in the local area in which individuals live will be identical for
individuals in both tenure regimes. That is, housing tenure regime will not affect the
decisions of acceptance or rejection of job offers not involving a residential change; the
reservation wage will be identical.
6
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     14      DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
Both conclusions, lower mobility among owners and identical decision rules in local
labour market, are tested using the empirical model described in the following subsec-
tions. Subsection 2.1 describes the data used in the estimation, Subsection 2.2 explains
the empirical model and the estimation method implemented, and finally Subsection 2.3
presents the results.
2.1 Data characteristics
The data used in the estimates come from the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP); five waves of the survey are used, covering the period 1994-98. The
ECHP consists of a fixed panel with an annual frequency; nevertheless, it also provides
information on the main economic activity in each month of the previous year for all
household members aged 16 years old or more. Thus, we can construct monthly duration
of the unemployment spells for each individual.
The choice of the individual data coming from this survey is due to three reasons.
First, the ECHP is like a merge of a Labour Force Survey (LFS) and a Family Expendi-
ture Survey (FES); that is, it contains rich information on individuals’ labour status and
on housing characteristics at the same time. Separately, neither survey allows the study
of housing and labour issues jointly. Second, the LFS does not include any information
on income. Third, the most important reason is that the ECHP is a fixed panel that
follows and interviews all the households belonging to the sample, even if they change
residence. Meanwhile, rotating panels, such as the LFS and the FES, do not interview
those households that change address.
Therefore, we need a fixed panel like the ECHP to study labour and residential
mobility. In addition, it helps us to make comparisons across European countries, since
this survey has been implemented in the same way and at the same time in all countries.
Labour market decisions are made individually by each household member, but hous-
ing tenure and mobility decisions are taken by the whole household, mainly by the family
head. So, the sample is formed by household heads. In order to obtain a homogeneous
7
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sample of individuals whose link to the labour market is stable, I restrict the sample to
family heads aged 25 to 64 years old with previous labour market experience.
The empirical approach that I use to study how housing tenure affects labour mobility
is a discrete unemployment duration model with two alternative exits to employment,
depending on whether they are associated with a residential change or not.
The stock sample is formed by those family heads who entered unemployment from
January 1994 to December 1997.4 I consider that a residential change occurs when a
change of address is produced at some point of the unemployment spell or up to two
months after the family head finds a job. This typically happens near the end of the
unemployment spell.
An important limitation of using the ECHP in order to study geographical mobility
is its reduced geographical breakdown of residential changes, since we can only know
whether it took place within the same province, from outside the province but within
the same country or from other country. This means that we cannot distinguish intra-
town from town-to-town residential changes. Given the limited inter-regional mobility
observed in Spain and in other European countries, and given the great importance
of intra-regional movements nowadays, I consider that there is geographical mobility
when an unemployed individual finds a job and this can be associated with a residential
change in the way explained above. Nevertheless, I am aware that this measure can
be potentially contaminated with residential changes due to other personal or housing
reasons, non job-related. This is one of the reasons for estimating the labour mobility
and the housing tenure status decisions jointly, so as to improve the estimates given
that I use an imperfect measure of geographical mobility. An additional motivation for
making housing tenure status endogenous to geographical mobility is to allow for the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which is potentially correlated across decisions.
4The information on the main economic activity in each month of the year refers to the year prior
to the survey, so that I do not have this information for 1998, the last wave of the survey included in
the sample.
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Before describing the empirical approach, I will comment on some of the charac-
teristics of the sample used in the estimation. In Table A.1 of the Appendix we can
distinguish two sets of countries according to the housing tenure regime observed in the
sample of unemployment spells: a first group formed by Germany and France, where
rental is the predominant tenure regime in 64% and 63.4%, respectively, of the house-
holds whose family head is unemployed. A second group includes Spain and Italy in
which 82.6% and 68.9% of the households live in an owned house, whereas almost a half
of the households lives in rental housing in the UK. Column 3 shows the geographical
mobility rate in each country, here identified as an exit to employment associated with a
residential change. Again, we can notice the existence of a negative relationship between
ownership and geographical mobility. Finally, column 4 gives the proportion of obser-
vations coming from each country in the sample; 46.7% of the observations correspond
to Spain, which reflects that the Spanish unemployment rate is much higher than in the
remaining countries. Note that only three waves of the ECHP survey are available for
Germany and the UK (from 1994 to 1996).
Table A.2 shows the main individual characteristics in the sample of unemployment
spells, distinguishing whether the exit is associated with a residential change or not.
First, we can observe that a high percentage of geographical mobility happens among
renters, 73.69% against 26.31% among owners; moreover, 60.53% of migrants are tenants
living in a private rented house. Second, geographical mobility is likely to occur among
individuals with higher levels of education, mainly among those having completed the
second stage of secondary education. Third, concerning household composition, single
individuals not cohabiting in a relation are more mobile, since 26.32% of the individuals
exiting to a job spell after changing residence are single, against the 19.79% of the indi-
viduals that found a job in their local labour market. Among those living with a partner,
individuals whose spouse or partner is working are less likely to move. When children
are younger, aged 6 years old or less, households seem to be more mobile. Regarding
9
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     17   DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
the characteristics of the previous job, people having worked in the service sector are
also more likely to move, whereas those having previous experience in agriculture are
almost immobile. Finally, the family head’s gender seems not to affect the geographical
mobility decision, and individuals having job tenure longer than one year in the previous
job are the least likely to move.
2.2 Econometric model of housing tenure and labour mobility
The empirical approach consists of estimating a discrete unemployment duration
model with two alternative exits to employment, depending on whether they are as-
sociated with a residential change or not. The stock sample is formed by N multiple
unemployment spells provided by I unemployed family heads, who have entered an un-
employment state possibly for several times since January 1994. The baseline of our
sample is January 1995, the starting point at which the exits to employment with each
of the two alternatives are observed to occur. Each spell and its length are denoted by
the subscript i and by Ti, respectively. The elapsed duration, Ti, can be broken down
into τ i + ri; τ i denotes the time spent in the unemployment state between the moment
at which the individual becomes unemployed and the moment at which the exits to
employment start to be observed, that is, January 1995; and ri denotes the time spent
in the unemployment state between January 1995 and the moment at which the exit to
employment occurs. As we can observe entrants to unemployment, I avoid the problem
of left-censoring, which happens due to the lack of knowledge of the exact date of the
beginning of the unemployment spell. Spells can only be complete or right-censored; the
latter case happens when the individual stops being interviewed by the ECHP before
he finds a job or when he enters a non-employment spell like retirement, education, etc.
The econometric method is similar to that used in Bover and Go´mez (2004) and
Barcelo´ (2005). Let Di be the indicator taking the value of 1 if the exit is associated
with a residential change, and the value of 0 if the exit is not associated with a residential
10
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change. The transition intensity to employment with the alternative k (with residential
change or not, k = 1, 0, respectively), denoted as θk [t | Xi(t)], conditional on a vector of
individual characteristics, Xi(t), is defined as the probability of leaving unemployment
at t months with the exit k given that the individual has been unemployed for at least
t months:
θk [t | Xi(t)] = Pr (Ti = t, Di = k | Ti ≥ t, Xi(t)) , k = 0, 1 (2.1)
The hazard function, θ [t | Xi(t)], or exit rate from unemployment conditional on the
characteristics vector, Xi(t), can be obtained as the sum of both transition intensities:
θ [t | Xi(t)] = Pr (Ti = t | Ti ≥ t, Xi(t)) =
1∑
j=0
θj [t | Xi(t)] (2.2)
These transition intensities are assumed to follow a multinomial logit specification
as follows:
θk [t | Xi(t)] = exp(Xi(t)
′βk)
1 +
∑1
j=0 exp(Xi(t)
′βj)
, k = 0, 1 (2.3)
The vector of characteristics, Xi(t), includes a second-degree polynomial in the loga-
rithm of duration as well as a constant, in order to capture duration dependence,5
household and family head characteristics, aggregate economic variables and country
dummies reflecting the differences in institutional characteristics across countries.
The estimation method consists of maximising the joint log-likelihood function de-
fined for both transitions.6 Using the relationships between distribution and density
functions conditional on Xi(t), the transition intensities of each alternative and the exit
rate described in equations (2.1) and (2.2), we obtain the contributions of each un-
5Due to the small size of the sample, which consists mainly of exits not associated with a residential
change, I specify duration dependence as a second-degree polynomial in the logarithm of duration
instead of estimating it semi-parametrically with duration dummies, as in Meyer (1990).
6As analysed in Bover and Go´mez (2004), when the transition intensities follow a multinomial logit
specification, this estimation method is equivalent to estimating a competing-risks model for each exit
separately. Thus, both provide consistent estimates of the same parameters; however, the first method
produces more efficient parameters estimates, since they are obtained jointly. Given the small size of
the sample, I have chosen this method.
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employment spell to the likelihood function. Thus, as we have a stock sample, complete
spells contribute to the likelihood of the probability of exiting at t months, t = τ i + ri,
with one of the two alternatives, k, conditional on τ i, the time spent in the unemploy-
ment spell prior to the baseline (that is, before January 1995), as follows:7
Pr (Ti = τ i + ri, Di = k | Ti > τ i, Xi(t)) = θk [τ i + ri | Xi(t)]
τ i+ri−1∏
s=τ i+1
(1− θ [s | Xi(s)]) , k = 0, 1
(2.4)
Censored spells contribute to the likelihood of the probability of finding a job after
having stayed unemployed for more than t months, conditional on the time spent in the
unemployment spell prior to the baseline:
Pr (Ti > τ i + ri | Ti > τ i, Xi(t)) =
τ i+ri∏
s=τ i+1
(1− θ [s | Xi(s)]) (2.5)
Let ci be the indicator of lack of censoring of spell i with duration ti, ti = τ i + ri,
then the joint log-likelihood function can be expressed as:
L(β) =
N∑
i=1
{(1−Di) ci log θ0(ti | Xi(ti)) +Dici log θ1(ti | Xi(ti))+
+ci
ti−1∑
s=τ i+1
log [1− θ0(s | Xi(s))− θ1(s | Xi(s))] +
+(1− ci)
ti∑
s=τ i+1
log [1− θ0(s | Xi(s))− θ1(s | Xi(s))]} (2.6)
Bover et al. (2002) and Bover and Go´mez (2004) explain how to rewrite the log-
likelihood function as the concatenation of the log-likelihood functions defined for the
survival subsample in each duration, when the sample is formed by flow data. In this
way, the estimation of the parameters of the transition intensities is made easier. In
case of a stock sample, the concatenation is done for the survival subsamples in each
duration of the spell that happens after the baseline, that is, we append the survival
subsamples of durations from τ i + 1 to τ i + ri months.
7Unemployment spells starting after January 1995 are treated as flow data, since the unemployment
spell duration elapsed before the baseline is zero months, that is, τ i = 0 and ri = t (see Lancaster,
1990).
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Explanatory variables The explanatory variables included in the vectorXi(t) are
the following. First, the institutional differences will be captured by two different ways:
by introducing country dummies in the estimates except for Spain (omitted category)
and by including some indicators of relevant housing and labour market characteristics
affecting the labour mobility decision. In particular, I use the information extracted
from Maclennan et al. (1998) about the percentage of transaction costs on house prices,
estimated for each country. This variable constitutes a proxy of the transaction costs
incurred in the purchase of a house, and it is introduced in logarithms in the estimates.
I also use an index measuring the strictness of the employment protection legislation
(hereafter, EPL) constructed by the OECD (1999).8 This index is also entered in
logarithms. The strictness in the employment protection legislation refers to the degree
of protection of regular and temporary employment and against collective dismissals.
See the Appendix for a detailed explanation of the different aspects of the employment
protection legislation covered by the EPL index. Using this index, these five European
countries could be classified in the following way: Germany and France are countries
with a medium degree of strictness, Italy and Spain have great strictness in employment
protection, and finally the United Kingdom shows a very low degree of employment
protection.
Finally, the last institutional characteristic considered is an overall average of un-
employment benefit replacement rates (%) that vary by unemployment duration and
family circumstances (single, with dependent spouse or with spouse in work). This
index is extracted from OECD (1994) and its logarithm is introduced in the estimation.
Second, the only aggregate economic variable considered is the quarterly national
unemployment rate in logarithms, plus seasonal indicators, using the fourth quarter as
the omitted category. I have not introduced a measure of real house prices due to the
difficulty in finding it for all countries. Moreover, I have not included any Consumer
8This indicator is an average of different indices evaluating the employment protection across coun-
tries, constructed for the late 1980s and 1990s. For the most recent date, this indicator also collects
information on the protection against collective dismissals. As the remaining indices do not vary greatly
from the first to the second period, I have used the latter.
13
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     21    DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
Price Indices for Rent and Rental Equivalence, due to the fact that these indices refer
to different national monetary currencies and quantities, although they are expressed in
the same base year. In addition, they cannot be used for making comparisons across
countries, due to other reasons commented on by Deaton (1998).
A third set of variables collects information on the household head’s previous job.
There are indicators of the economic sector, only for industry and services; previous
jobs in agriculture and construction are considered as the omitted category, given the
shortage of exits associated with a residential change for these sectors. I include an indi-
cator of working time, taking the value of 1 for a full-time job, the logarithm of monthly
experience at the previous job, and an interaction of experience with the logarithm of
unemployment duration.
Experience variables will not only pick up the positive effect of experience on the
exit rate to employment, but they will also capture the effect of the entitlement to
receive unemployment benefits, since this is mainly determined by tenure at previous job.
In this sense, the experience variables will also reflect that: the greater the experience is,
the higher the level of unemployment benefits and the longer the duration of its receipt.
Thus, the greater the experience, the higher the reservation wage is; that is why the
sign of its coefficient is not determined.
I have not included income nor the amount received related to benefits, although this
information exists in the ECHP. This is due to the fact that the information on income
and on main economic activity in each month is contemporary, so that the inclusion of
their lags would imply the loss of a great number of observations. Given the reduced size
of the sample, I prefer not to introduce them in the estimates. In addition, the amount
of benefits can only be assigned to each unemployment duration in an imperfect way:
I do not know the accurate dates in which they were received within the same year, so
that this variable would suffer from large measurement errors.
However, I construct a dummy indicating whether the individual received any amount
of unemployment benefits during the years in which the unemployment spell happens.
14
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Finally, a fourth set of variables refers to personal characteristics such as the level of
education (including an interaction of the highest level with the logarithm of unemploy-
ment duration), the family head’s gender, and the logarithm of family head’s age. As
indicators of the household’s composition and size, I have included a dummy for whether
the individual lives with a partner (married or not), an indicator of whether the spouse
or the partner is employed, and the number of children aged 18 years old or less in the
household and its square.
After having controlled for such observed heterogeneity, I introduce an indicator
taking the value of 1 if the individual is a homeowner, and the value of 0 if he is a
renter, in order to find out whether housing tenure affects the geographical mobility
decision. Moreover, I include a dummy variable revealing the existence of outstanding
mortgages among owners.9
As Hughes and McCormick (1981), Henley (1998) and others have stated, in the case
of the UK, renters living in social housing have as low incentives to move as owners,
since they will lose their rent control if they move. In order to take this into account, an
indicator of whether renters are living in social housing is introduced in the estimation.
2.3 Estimation results
The parameter estimates of the transition intensities are shown in Table 1. Columns
under the heading (i) present estimates for a specification in which country dummies
capture the institutional differences, while, in specification (ii), these dummies are re-
placed by indices evaluating several characteristics of the housing and labour markets
in these countries.
Table 1 shows the coefficient estimates and t-ratios of each transition intensity to em-
ployment, whether associated with a residential change, θ1 [t | X(t)], or not, θ0 [t | X(t)].
9Although the sample size is very small and we control for a large number of explanatory variables,
the model is not saturated and is estimated parametrically. I need to take into account a large number of
explanatory variables that affect both the geographical mobility and the housing tenure regime. In this
way, the estimates of the housing tenure coefficients are not biased due to a problem of omitted variables.
Nevertheless, I have also estimated the model considering smaller sets of explanatory variables, and the
estimation results are the same.
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The explanatory variables, common to both specifications, have coefficient and t-ratio
values which are very similar to each other, except for the constant and the unemploy-
ment rate. For this reason, I will only comment on the estimates of specification (i),
except for those estimates diverging significantly.
First, we observe that the ownership indicator is significant at the 1% level in explain-
ing exits associated with a residential change, θ1 [t | X(t)]; it has a coefficient estimate
of −1.805, which means that owners are more reluctant to move to other area to work.
The probability of this exit still falls more for owners having outstanding loans or mort-
gages. Similarly, social housing also affects negatively exits to a job spell associated with
a residential change, since its coefficient estimate has a value of −1.177, which is signifi-
cant at the 5% level. In contrast, in exits to employment in the local area, θ0 [t | X(t)],
the ownership and social housing coefficient estimates are near zero, 0.111 and 0.122
respectively, and not significant at the 5% level. This seems to provide evidence for the
hypothesis that owners and renters living in social housing are less willing to migrate
for job reasons, and they behave in a similar way to private renters in the local labour
market. Next, the statistical significance of housing tenure must be corroborated by its
economic significance in the probabilities predicted by the model, which are presented
in Table 2. In contrast, in the local labour market, unemployed owners having an out-
standing mortgage leave unemployment with a higher probability than both types of
renters and the rest of owners at the 1% significance level, maybe due to the fact that
they have to repay debts.
Concerning the country dummies, most of their coefficient estimates are significant
in explaining both types of exits to a job spell, which reflects institutional differences in
housing and labour market across countries. The intensity of mobility across countries
is not only captured by the country dummies, but it is also reflected in the coefficient
of the unemployment rate. For this reason, it is necessary to compute the predicted
probabilities implied by the model, since it is not possible to observe this feature directly
from the estimates.
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Regarding the economic variables, the unemployment rate has the expected sign in
both exits to a job spell, although it is only significant at the 1% level in exits associated
with a residential change. However, exits to a job occur during the period 1995-97, which
does not cover a complete business cycle for each country. As seasonal indicators have
been introduced in the specifications, the negative sign of the quarterly unemployment
rate will not only capture the effect of the business cycle, but also the cross-section
variation across countries. This idea is corroborated in the estimates of specification (ii)
in which the unemployment rate does not have the expected sign.
It is expected that, when regional differences in unemployment rates and in other
economic variables are large within a country, inter-regional migration due to job reasons
will be observed from more depressed to richer regions. However, McCormick (1997)
and Bentolila (1997) have observed that geographical mobility seems not to respond to
differentials in the regional economic conditions significantly in the UK and in Spain,
respectively, using aggregate regional data. I tried to introduce a variable measuring the
dispersion in unemployment rates (a proxy of economic conditions) across regions, but
the results were not satisfactory, mainly for the reason that residential mobility in the
sample may occur between shorter distances, but there is no available data to capture
this effect.
Regarding the characteristics at the previous job, individuals having worked in the
service and industry sectors have a lower probability of leaving unemployment than in
the other sectors, whereas the economic sector does not seem to explain mobility. The
experience attained at the previous job is not a significant influence on exits associ-
ated with a residential change; however, it affects negatively exits to a job in the local
area. The reason for this is that the predominant effect is the entitlement to receive
unemployment benefits, which raises the reservation wage and decreases the probability
of accepting a job. As the unemployment duration increases, this negative impact on
exits to a job spell disappears, indicating the approach to the end of the unemployment
benefit receipt. This result has also been found in Bover and Go´mez (2004).
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The effect of experience in the labour market is captured through the logarithm of
age. Its impact on geographical mobility cannot be estimated robustly due to the small
sample size. However, it has a negative impact on exits to a job spell in the local labour
market, indicating that as aged family heads become unemployed, it is more difficult
for them to find another job, maybe due to the fact that their knowledge becomes more
obsolete, and firms prefer to hire younger people. Finally, individuals having completed
the second stage of secondary education seem to be more mobile; the coefficient estimate
for this exit is 0.936, significant at the 5% level. In the local labour market, individuals
having completed tertiary education leave unemployment with a higher probability,
although this positive influence disappears as the unemployment spell lengthens.
Concerning working time, individuals who previously worked full-time have a higher
probability of exiting from unemployment in their local area. This can be a consequence
of their more stable and stronger link to the labour market, whereas the activity of those
working part-time may be more sporadic, and their job search intensity may be lower.
Nevertheless, this effect is not statistically significant.
Moreover, male family heads have a higher probability of leaving unemployment with
respect to their female counterparts, since the gender indicator has a coefficient estimate
of 0.326 and it is significant at the 1% level. This may capture several effects, among
them the following: women may have a higher reservation wage than men (but not very
different since both are family heads) and women may be discriminated in the sense of
receiving job offers at a lower rate or with worse wage conditions than men. Concerning
household composition, the indicator of being married or living with a partner is not
significant in explaining any transition, although the fact that the spouse or partner
is employed affects exits associated with a residential change negatively, as expected.
Children variables have the expected sign, but they are not significant at the 5% level.
The receipt of unemployment benefits has the expected effects on both types of
exits, although it is only significant in explaining exits to a job spell in local areas.
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The negative effect of this entitlement disappears as the unemployment spell increases
and the end of the receipt becomes closer.
Regarding duration dependence, it cannot be determined robustly in transitions to
employment associated with a residential change given the small number of observations
to this type of exit. On the contrary, dependence is negative for transitions in the local
labour market: the longer the unemployment spell is, the more difficult the exit becomes,
due to the obsolescence of the worker’s knowledge, stigma effects or the unemployed
worker’s discouragement.
Finally, in specification (ii), the country indicators have been replaced by some in-
dices measuring characteristics of housing and labour markets. Concerning the degree
of strictness in employment protection legislation, we see that the higher the strictness
is in a country, the lower the probability of leaving unemployment in the local area.
This feature is stronger in countries with high protection, as Southern Europe, namely
Spain and Italy. However, this result is not found in exits associated with a residential
change. As mentioned above, the unemployment rate may be capturing cross-country
variation rather than the business cycle, since its coefficient’s sign is reverted, and it is
significant in exits to a job in the local labour market.
The logarithm of the percentage that transaction taxes represent of the house price
plays the role of a proxy of the transaction costs that individuals incur when they buy
a house. This measure does not behave as expected, since it is not significant, although
it has a negative coefficient estimate in exits associated with a residential change. I
also interacted this variable with the ownership indicator in order to capture a different
behaviour by owners and renters, but it was insignificant. In addition, I tried another
measure evaluating the transaction costs contained in Maclennan et al. (1998), but the
results were identical. Finally, the unemployment benefit replacement rate is expected
to reflect the effect of unemployment protection legislation on the unemployed workers’
geographical mobility. Its coefficient estimate is positive, but it is insignificant due to
the small sample size.
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As the index of transaction costs does not behave as expected and the sign and size
of the coefficient estimates do not vary much except for the unemployment rate, the
specification (i) will be used in the remaining sections.
Predicted probabilities In order to evaluate the size of the effects of explanatory
variables on both transition intensities, Table 2 contains the probabilities predicted by
the estimates of model (i) in Table 1. Column 1 shows the predicted probability of
transition to a job spell associated with a residential change (θ1) and column 2 to a job
in the local labour market (θ0). In each row, the sum of the percentages shown in both
columns gives us the exit rate to employment (equation (2.2)) predicted for an individual
with the relevant characteristic. The first row shows these probabilities for the reference
person, and the following rows for an individual with the same characteristics as the
reference person except for the characteristic indicated. Thus, the economic impact
of each explanatory variable is analysed by comparing the probabilities shown in the
corresponding row with those of the reference person.
The reference person is a male family head living in a private rented house in Spain;
he is single, aged 30 years old, does not have any children, and his level of education
is lower than the second level of secondary; he has been unemployed for 4 months,
has previously worked full-time in industry for 6 months, and does not receive any
unemployment benefits. The unemployment rate is evaluated at its average level in
1995, and the seasonal indicators are set at the fourth quarter. For the reference person,
the probability of transition to employment associated with a residential change is 0.64%,
whereas that to a job in the local labour market is 11.80%. Thus, his predicted exit rate
is equal to 12.44%, the sum of both probabilities.
Two features stand out in Table 2. First, the difference in size of the probabilities
displayed in both columns makes obvious that, in all European countries analysed, the
unemployed prefer to search and to accept a job in their local area rather than moving
to another place to work. Geographical mobility is rarely observed in all countries, al-
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though this fact is more stressed in the UK, Spain and Germany, in which the predicted
probabilities for the reference person are 0.53%, 0.64% and 0.89%, respectively. The
most mobile countries are France and Italy, whose predicted probabilities for the refer-
ence person are 1.77% and 0.94%, respectively. The predicted probabilities for Germany
and the UK are extremely low, mainly in column 2; this is due to their small sample size
of unemployed family heads (they account for 6.98% and 7.21%, respectively, of the total
unemployment spells, see Table A.1) and due to the high proportion of censored spells,
70.67% and 59.35% of German and British samples, respectively, as we can observe in
Table A.3 in the Appendix.
Second, when housing tenure is taken into account, the probability of geographical
mobility is considerably smaller for an owner than for a private tenant, since this proba-
bility falls from 0.64% for a private renter to 0.10%, in the case of Spain. Social housing
also reduces the incentives to geographical mobility, since this probability falls to 0.20%.
However, the exit to employment in the local area is not affected by housing tenure,
since the predicted probabilities do not vary significantly, except for the homeowners
having outstanding mortgages; that is, owners and renters behave in a similar way in
this market. Therefore, there is evidence for the hypothesis explained at the beginning
of this section.
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3 Addressing potential unobserved heterogeneity in
labour mobility and ownership status
The previous section considered ownership status as a predetermined variable in
the two possible transition intensities to a job spell. However, the analysis carried out
about the effect of housing tenure on the unemployed workers’ mobility decision may be
contaminated by the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in these transitions, possibly
correlated with housing tenure status. This section studies if those results are biased
by the disregard of the unobserved heterogeneity. For this purpose, Subsection 3.1 first
investigates the main determinants of housing tenure status in the sample of unemployed
family heads used in Section 2, using differences in the institutional characteristics of
the housing markets across European countries. Subsection 3.2 carries out the same
analysis as in the previous section allowing for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
correlated with the ownership status equation considered below.
3.1 Determinants of the housing tenure status
Let hi be the indicator of the housing tenure status of the individual i, which takes
the values of 0 if he is a private renter, of 1 if he is an owner and of 2 if he lives in a
social rented house.
The decision of housing tenure is modelled in a similar way as in King (1980) and
Duce (1995). The preference of individual i between ownership and private rental is
denoted by the indicator h∗i that takes the value of 1 if he chooses ownership and
the value of 0 if he chooses private rental. This choice is assumed to follow a logit
specification as follows:
Pr (h∗i = 1 | Zi) =
exp(Z ′iδ)
1 + exp(Z ′iδ)
(3.1)
Each component of the parameter vector, δ, reflects how an increase in the corres-
ponding explanatory variable affects the utility of being an owner in comparison with
that of being a private renter.
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The value of this indicator is unobserved for individuals living in a social rented
house. These individuals may be unable to access either an owned-occupied house
due to loan rationing reasons or a private rented house. However, the access to social
housing is also restricted, since its low housing cost may cause a large demand. Thus,
the admission to social housing is often based on some criteria, such as low income levels,
number of children and family head’s age among others. Let qi be the indicator of this
admission, that is, it takes the value of 1 if individual i obtains a subsidised house, and
the value of 0 otherwise. The admission to social housing is also assumed to follow a
logit specification as follows:
Pr (qi = 1 | Z2i) = exp(Z
′
2iγ)
1 + exp(Z ′2iγ)
(3.2)
The vector of explanatory variables, Z2i, is a subset of household characteristics
vector Zi and it contains the criteria on which the admission is based. Particularly, I
consider income, the number of children aged 18 years old or less in the household, the
logarithm of the family head’s age and country dummies to allow for different housing
policies concerning social housing. I have excluded the family head’s gender due to its
non-significance in the estimates.
Thus, the probability of observing a private renter or an owner is as follows:
Pr (hi | Zi) = Pr (h∗i | Zi) [1− Pr (qi = 1 | Z2i)] , hi = h∗i , h∗i = 0, 1 (3.3)
That is, we observe both housing tenures when individual i is not admitted to obtain
subsidised rental. Finally, the probability of an individual living in a social rented house
is equal to the probability of being admitted:
Pr (hi = 2 | Zi) = Pr (qi = 1 | Z2i) (3.4)
The main determinants of the housing tenure status can be studied using equations
(3.1)-(3.4). The explanatory variables included in the vector Zi are: the logarithm of
the household’s total income in the previous period, normalised by the purchasing power
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parity (hereafter, PPP), the indicator of living with a partner, the number of children
aged 18 years old or less and its square, and the gender, the logarithm of age and the
level of education of the family head.
Before showing the estimates of the tenure status equation, I will comment on the
densities of the family head’s age and the logarithm of household’s income, for each
type of housing tenure (ownership or rental) and country, estimated using the sample
of unemployment spells. These estimated densities consist of Epanechnikov kernels, in
which the bandwidth is chosen optimally; they are displayed in Figures 1 and 2. In
Figure 1, the age profile shows how tenure status varies along the life-cycle. Among
the younger workers, the probability of living in a rented house is the highest. This
probability is increasing until the age band of 30 to 33 years old, except for Italy, where
this probability continues increasing until the age of 39 years old; then, the probability
of renting begins to decrease. The largest proportion of owners is concentrated in the
age range from 45 to 55 years old, varying across countries, when individuals have
accumulated enough wealth to invest in an owned house. At older ages, the proportion
of owners starts to decrease. France is the country in which the proportion of owners
overcomes that of renters at the youngest age, 35 years old, followed by the United
Kingdom and Spain at the ages of 37 and 40 years old, respectively. Germany and Italy
are the countries in which this transition happens much later, at the age of 46 and 47
years old, respectively.
Regarding the estimated density of income, Figure 2 shows that ownership is the
predominant tenure only at high levels of income. This feature is stronger in Germany,
France and the UK, where the density of the logarithm of income for the owners is
shifted towards the right, far from that of the renters. On the contrary, in Spain and
Italy, housing tenure status does not seem to depend on income so much, since both
densities are more similar to each other.
Table 3 shows the estimates of the main determinants of tenure status equation, de-
scribed in equations (3.3) and (3.4), for the pooling of subsamples of unemployed family
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heads’ spells in all countries used to estimate the duration model in Section 2. Again,
the indicator for Spain is omitted in order to include a constant in the estimates. The
total number of spells, 2, 150, is used to estimate the equation of admission to subsidised
rental; however, the parameters of the ownership status equation are identified only us-
ing 1, 883 spells corresponding with households that do not live in a social rented house.
Specification (i) shows the existence of differences in housing policies supporting home
ownership, since the country indicators except for the UK are significant in explaining
home ownership status at the 1% level. In comparison with Germany and France, Spain,
the United Kingdom and Italy are the countries in which home ownership is made more
attractive than private rental by the specific characteristics of their housing market.
The logarithm of age is also significant at the 1% level in explaining the ownership
status; its coefficient estimate is 3.102, which indicates that the older the family head
is, the more likely it is that the household lives in an owned house. As expected, the
income variable has a positive coefficient estimate, significant at the 1% level; the higher
the level of income, the higher the probability of living in an owned house is. As we saw
in Figure 2, the country indicators may capture, among other things, the movement of
the density function of being an owner to the right in the case of Germany and France
for a given level of income; however, the shape of the probability of living in an owned
house by the level of income seems to be the same in all countries, and any interactions
of income with country dummies are not included in the estimates.
Regarding the household’s composition, individuals who are married or living with
a partner are more likely to live in an owned house. Household size, measured by the
number of children aged 18 years old or less in the household and by its square, affects
positively the probability of living in an owned house, but at a lower rate as household
size increases. This effect is found if we consider social housing as another housing tenure
different from private rental. Otherwise, the effect of household size on the probability of
being an owner is negative, indicating less ability to accumulate wealth as size increases.
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The level of education could also play the role of a proxy for wealth; thus, we would
expect that the higher this level is, the larger are the accumulated wealth and the higher
the probability of living in an owned house. Nevertheless, education does not capture
this effect; the highest level of education has an insignificant and wrong-signed coefficient
estimate, and the second stage of secondary education has a positive coefficient value,
but it is not significant at the 10% level. As another proxy for wealth, I included an
indicator of whether the household owned a second house, but I finally removed it from
the estimates because of its insignificance.
In specification (ii), country dummies have been replaced by other variables reflecting
different characteristics of policies supporting home ownership across countries. Three
variables have been constructed based on the information provided in Maclennan et
al. (1998). First, I use the logarithm of the stamp duty incurred in the purchase of a
house as a percentage of the house price; and also the logarithm of the ratio of social
to private rented accommodation prevailing in each country. The last variable is an
indicator taking the value of 1 if interest tax reliefs are allowed in income taxes due
to the repayment of the outstanding mortgage. The first two variables are expected to
affect negatively the choice of living in an owned house; on the contrary, the interest
tax relief should affect it positively. In the estimates, all three variables are significant
at the 1% level, with the expected signs.
Concerning the equation of admission to social housing, all country dummies have
positive coefficient estimates, significant at the 1% level, indicating that Spain is the
country in which subsidised rental is least promoted by the authorities. Meanwhile, the
access to a social house can be more easily obtained in the UK, France and Germany.
The rest of explanatory variables are significant with the expected signs, lower income
levels, younger family head and bigger household size increase the probability of obtain-
ing a subsidised rented house.
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3.2 Unobserved heterogeneity in transitions to employment
and in ownership status
In this subsection, I present estimates of the housing tenure status equation jointly
with the unemployment duration model with multiple exits, in order to control for
unobserved heterogeneity in transitions to a job spell correlated with ownership status.
Ownership status may be positively correlated with unobserved human capital and
ability, since they increase the individuals’ wealth accumulation. In addition, human
capital contributes to raise the probability of transitions to employment, not only in
the local labour market, but also in other geographical areas. Thus, the coefficient of
ownership status in exits associated with a residential change may be biased upwards
spuriously if owners are more skilled than renters on average, due to unobserved human
capital variables that increase their probability of geographical mobility.
Moreover, the composition of the sample of unemployment spells according to hous-
ing tenure may be altered by a higher proportion of renters that, on average, have a less
favourable unobserved ability to abandon unemployment than owners. This will cause
it to be less likely to observe geographical mobility among renters, since this decision is
greatly influenced by human capital and skill. Thus, the estimate of the owner status
coefficient in exits associated with a residential change will be also increased spuriously
for this motive if the presence of unobserved heterogeneity is not allowed for.
In addition, unobserved heterogeneity may also capture other factors making home
ownership endogenous, such as the idea of rental as a temporary housing tenure regime
for those individuals who expect to move in the near future.
Following Heckman and Singer (1984), the unobserved heterogeneity is specified as
a discrete variable with a finite support, in this case, of two mass points. Given that
the sample is formed by I individuals having multiple unemployment spells, the log-
likelihood function has been constructed as in Ham and LaLonde (1996) and Meghir
and Whitehouse (1997).10 As I have repeated spell durations for a non-negligible
10Ham and LaLonde (1996) study the effects of a training program on subsequent employment and
unemployment spells, and Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) analyse the labour history of individuals
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proportion of individuals (27.2%) accounting for 50.6% of spells, allowing for unobserved
heterogeneity becomes more advisable.
The unobservables are assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables, Xi
and Zi, other than ownership status, h
∗
i . The admission to social housing is assumed to
be based only on observed characteristics; so, unobserved heterogeneity will not take part
in equation (3.4). For simplicity of exposition, I will redefine the vector of characteristics
relevant in the duration model as (Xi, hi) in order to consider separately ownership
status from the rest. Let ηi be the permanent unobserved effect on both transitions
to employment and the ownership status equation for individual i. The unobserved
effect is assumed to take a value on the support {m1, m2} with probabilities of p1
and p2, respectively. Imposing that the expectation of the unobserved heterogeneity is
null, E [ηi] = 0, and that the probabilities, p1 and p2, add up to one, the estimation
of the unobservables is reduced to only a mass point, say m1 = m, and its associated
probability, p1 = p, 0 < p < 1.
11
The transition intensity to employment with the alternative k, k = 0, 1, and the own-
ership status equation conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity and the observables
are specified, respectively, as follows:
θk [t | Xi(t), hi, ηi] =
exp(Xi(t)
′βk + hiβhk + αkηi)
1 +
∑1
j=0 exp(Xi(t)
′βj + hiβhj + αjηi)
, k = 0, 1 (3.5)
Pr (h∗i = 1 | Zi, ηi) = Λ (Z ′iδ + αηi) =
exp (Z ′iδ + αηi)
1 + exp (Z ′iδ + αηi)
(3.6)
Pr (hi | Zi, ηi) = Pr (h∗i | Zi, ηi) [1− Pr (qi = 1 | Z2i)] , hi = h∗i , h∗i = 0, 1
Pr (hi = 2 | Zi, ηi) = Pr (qi = 1 | Z2i)
near the retirement age, facing a problem of initial conditions caused by the dependence of subsequent
employment and non-employment spells. They solve this problem by assuming a different distribution
for the first spell observed for each individual. Although my sample consists of multiple spells, this
problem does not appear because I do not study entire labour histories, but only unemployment spells.
11This implies that p2 = 1− p and m2 = − pm(1−p) .
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Unobserved heterogeneity in this model follows a one-factor structure. Thus, the
permanent individual effects in equations (3.5) and (3.6) are perfectly correlated with
one another, although they can be inversely correlated and they can have a different
impact in each equation according to the sign and size of the modifiers α0, α1, and α.
As a result, the parameters related to the unobservables that have to be estimated are
m, p, α0 and α, if α1 is normalised to 1.
The unobserved individual effect η is invariant across all unemployment spells and
housing tenure regimes observed for each individual. Thus, the unemployment spells
of each individual cannot be treated as independent observations in contrast with the
homogeneous case of the duration model in Section 2. Under the absence of unobserved
heterogeneity, the duration model and housing tenure status can be estimated separately
by maximum likelihood. However, when allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, the joint
log-likelihood cannot be split into the sum of two log-likelihoods defined separately.
The sample is regrouped in i = 1, 2, . . . , I individuals who have been unemployed
for ni = n1, n2, . . . , nI times, respectively; that is, the individual i provides ni un-
employment spells to the sample, and
∑I
i=1 ni = N , the sample size of unemploy-
ment spells in Section 2. Let (Ti1, Ti2, . . . Tini) be the sequence of the duration of
each of the ni unemployment spells in which the individual i has stayed, with the
following realisation of spell durations, (τ i1 + ri1, ti2, . . . , tini), distinguishing the du-
ration of the spell prior to the baseline, τ i1, only for the first unemployment spell,
ti1 = τ i1+ ri1, since the remaining spells are fresh for the individual i. In the same way,
(ci1, ci2, . . . , cini) denotes the sequence of indicators of lack of censoring. The explana-
tory variables relevant to each unemployment spell are regrouped for each individual
i as follows: Xi = [Xi (Ti1) , Xi (Ti2) , . . . , Xi(Tini)] , Zi = (Zi1, Zi2, . . . , Zini) , Di =
(Di1, Di2, . . . , Dini)
′ and hi = (hi1, hi2, . . . , hini)
′ .
Then, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity and observables, individual i con-
tributes to the likelihood of the probability of observing that sequence of unemployment
spell durations, exits to employment and housing tenure status in each of the spells.
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Using the definition of transition intensities and equations (3.5) and (3.6), this contri-
bution can be factorised as follows :
Pr
(
{tij, Dij, cij, hij}nij=1 | Ti1 > τ i1, Xi, Zi, ηi
)
=
ni∏
j=2
Pr (tij, Dij, cij | Xi(tij), hij, ηi) ·
Pr (τ i1 + ri1, Di1, ci1 | Ti1 > τ i1, Xi(ti1), hi1, ηi)
ni∏
j=1
Pr (hij | Zij, ηi) =
=
ni∏
j=1
(
[θ1 (tij | hij, Xi(tij), ηi)]Dijcij [θ0 (tij | hij, Xi(tij), ηi)](1−Dij)cij ·
[1− θ (tij | hij, Xi(tij), ηi)](1−cij) · Pr (hij | Zij, ηi)
) ti1−1∏
s=τ i1+1
(1− θ (s | hi1, Xi(s), ηi)) ·
ni∏
j=2
(
tij−1∏
s=1
(1− θ (s | hij, Xi(s), ηi))
)
(3.7)
Finally, to obtain the contribution to the likelihood, Li, the unobserved heterogeneity
has to be integrated out, and the log-likelihood function has the following form:
L =
I∑
i=1
logLi =
=
I∑
i=1
log
{
2∑
l=1
[
Pr
(
{tij, Dij, cij, hij}nij=1 | Ti1 > τ i1, Xi, Zi, ηi = ml
)
pl
]}
(3.8)
The results are found in Table 4. Most of the significant variables do not change
much in their coefficient size or significance when we control for unobserved heterogene-
ity. However, the estimated coefficient of the ownership status in exits associated with
a residential change becomes more negative, from −1.805 to −2.066, giving evidence
favourable to the hypothesis that unobserved human capital variables could bias up-
wards this coefficient. Moreover, the same variable in exits to a job in the local area
becomes significant with a coefficient estimate of 0.600, indicating that this specifica-
tion of heterogeneity does not capture all the unobservables, since owners could enjoy
higher arrival rates of a job offer or better-paid job offers due to their human capital.
These findings are corroborated by analysing the predicted probabilities of both mod-
els. About the indicator of living in social rented housing, the unconditional predicted
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probabilities of the model with unobserved heterogeneity are very similar to those of the
model not controlling for it, although its coefficient estimates now become significant in
both exits to employment.
Concerning age, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, older family heads
have more difficulty in leaving unemployment. In the same way, ownership status be-
comes much more dependent of the family head’s age and total income, since their
estimated elasticities become larger. Moreover, when unobserved heterogeneity is al-
lowed for, ownership status responds a bit less intensively to housing policies, such as
the existence of interest tax relief in income taxes, and the ratio of social to private
rented accommodation prevailing in each country. However, it becomes more sensitive
to the decrease in the stamp duties to pay for the purchase of a house. Regarding edu-
cation, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, individuals having completed the
third level of education seem to prefer to live in a private rented house rather than in
an owned house. Finally, the value of the log-likelihood function does not increase so
much when the unobserved heterogeneity specification has three mass points.
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4 Effects of mobility and unemployment duration
on post-unemployment wages
This section is divided in two parts: subsection 4.1 describes the empirical model,
and subsection 4.2 presents the estimation results.
4.1 Estimation method of the wage equation
This section focuses on the main determinants of the wage level obtained by indi-
viduals just after leaving unemployment, as in other studies like Addison and Portugal
(1989). In the first place, I want to study whether this level depends on the length
of the unemployment spell, so I introduce the logarithm of duration, log Ti, as other
determinant in the wage equation. This explanatory variable will capture two effects:
first, the obsolescence of the unemployed worker’s knowledge, and second, the firms’
reluctance to hire individuals having been unemployed for a long time, since employers
may think that long unemployment spells are a bad signal about their productivity (the
stigma effect). Thus, this variable is expected to have a negative coefficient estimate.
In the second place, as commented in Section 1, I am also interested in finding
whether those individuals who accept a job associated with a residential change obtain a
higher wage on average than those who exit from unemployment in their local area. If so,
policy-makers should promote housing policies encouraging geographical mobility among
the unemployed workers. Economic theory does not provide a clear prediction about
the gain in wages when geographical mobility occurs. In a partial job search model,
when regions are heterogeneous in their offer arrival rates and in their wage distribution
functions, individuals living in depressed regions are more likely to receive higher wage
offers if they move to wealthier regions. In this case, geographical mobility has a positive
impact on the wage level that individuals achieve just after leaving unemployment.
However, in a multi-period model of job search, individuals take into account that
their current decisions influence their expected future utility, and they will accept a
wage offer in other region only if this is greater than the reservation wage. As the
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reservation wage is determined by expectations, the wages accepted by migrants in the
destination region might not be higher than those they would have obtained in their
origin region. That is, if the destination region has a lower unemployment rate, a higher
arrival rate of job offers to the employed, and a lower probability of being dismissed
than the origin region does, their reservation wage of moving will be comparatively
lower than that for accepting a job in their local area. This will happen if moving costs
are low enough. Individuals will have a higher reservation wage for accepting a job in
their depressed region, since the possibility of changing to another better-paid job will
be lower. Therefore, in this sense, the effect of geographical mobility on the wage level
obtained just after leaving unemployment may be negative in comparison with the wage
level that they could have obtained in their local depressed region.
In order to capture the impact of geographical mobility on the wage level, I include
the indicator, Di, defined in Section 2, which describes the alternative chosen by the
family head, whether a job associated with a residential change (Di = 1) or a job in the
local labour market (Di = 0).
A problem arises when the wage equation is estimated using only the subsample of
those unemployed individuals who exit from unemployment. In this way, this estimate
does not correspond with the mean of the potential wage distribution. This distribu-
tion will depend on the regional characteristics as well as job-related ones, but it is not
affected by the individuals’ decision rules. On the contrary, the distribution of accepted
wages is influenced by these rules, since all accepted wages are higher than the individ-
uals’ reservation wages. This means that a problem of self-selection bias arises, since
individuals decide to remain unemployed and not to accept wage offers, if these are not
greater than their reservation wage.
This bias can be avoided by computing the equivalent to the inverse Mill’s ratio in
the model of labour mobility described in Section 2. The inverse Mill’s ratio or Heck-
man’s lambda is typical of models in which the participation equation follows a probit
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specification, and in which the disturbances of the wage and participation equations are
correlated with each other and distributed jointly as a Normal multivariate.12
In this paper, two participation equations exist: whether to accept a job associated
with a residential change (Di = 1), and whether to accept a job in the local labour
market (Di = 0). These two equations are given by the transition intensities defined in
equations (2.1) and (2.3); so, they follow a multinomial logit specification.
Let wki(t), k = 0, 1, be the result of the comparison of the wage received with the
corresponding reservation wage. These comparisons are not observed by the econome-
trician, and they are assumed to follow the specification below, in accordance with the
model described in Section 2:
wki(t) = Xi(t)
′βk + εki, k = 0, 1;
F (ε0i, ε1i | Xi(t)) = 1
1 + exp(−ε0i) + exp(−ε1i) ; (4.1)
where βk is the parameter vector displayed in equation (2.3).
The vector of characteristics, Xi(t), is the same as in Section 2. In order to simplify
the notation, I will leave the index t out of the characteristics vector Xi, although it
includes time-varying variables.
Individual i will leave unemployment with the alternative k, Di = k, k = 0, 1, if
this provides him with the maximum level of the wage over the reservation wage of
each alternative, max {w1i, w0i} = wki, and if this is greater than the reservation wage,
wki ≥ 0:
Di = k if max {w1i, w0i} = wki and wki ≥ 0, k = 0, 1 (4.2)
12Mroz (1987) estimated a model of female labour supply in which distributional assumptions dif-
ferent from those involved in the Heckman’s lambda were also considered in the participation equation,
in particular, a logit participation model.
34
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     42    DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
Let wi be the logarithm of the wage level that individual i obtains just after leaving
unemployment, then this wage is specified as follows:
w∗i = αDi + Z
′
iδ + pi log Ti + ui, i = 1, 2, . . . N
wi =
 w
∗
i if ci = 1
0 if ci = 0
(4.3)
That is, the wage is only observed if the individual leaves unemployment with one of
the two possible exits to employment. The variables in Zi are related to new job char-
acteristics, and they consist of some characteristics such as age or education, common
to those in Xi. The distributional assumptions on the disturbance, ui, are as follows:
ui = ρ0ε0i + ρ1ε1i + vi, (4.4)
E [vi | Di, Zi, Ti, Xi] = 0,
cov(vi, εki | Di, Zi, Ti, Xi) = 0, k = 0, 1
The disturbance can be broken down as the sum of two terms: a first term, vi,
is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables of the wage equation and with those of
transition intensities, and a second term, ρ0ε0i+ρ1ε1i, is correlated with the disturbances,
ε0i and ε1i, of the equations for the comparison of the wage offers with the reservation
wage.
In order to obtain an expression of the self-selection bias arising from equation (4.3),
it is useful to define indicators Ai, A1i, and A0i for individual i as follows:
A0i = 1 (max {w1i, w0i} = w0i and w0i ≥ 0)
A1i = 1 (max {w1i, w0i} = w1i and w1i ≥ 0)
Ai = A0i + A1i
(4.5)
Note that Ai can only take the values 0 or 1, since A0i and A1i cannot take the value
of 1 at the same time. The dummy variable, Ai, indicates that the individual exits to
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a job spell: when he finds a job in his local area, Ai0 = 1, or when he moves, Ai1 = 1.
These indicators have been defined in order to make the notation and the exposition of
the wage equation model clearer.
If we estimate equation (4.3) by ordinary least squares (OLS) robust to heteroskedas-
ticity, a problem of self-selection bias arises because we do not condition only on the
subsample of individuals leaving unemployment, that is, on those individuals whose
wage is observed, Ai = 1.
To study the mean of potential wages, we can carry out a two-step procedure similar
to the Heckman’s two-step estimator,13 but applied to the duration model described
in Sections 2 and 4. First, we have to know the functional form of this bias; for that
purpose, we condition equation (4.3) on all the explanatory variables and on Ai = 1 as
follows:
E [wi | Di, Zi, Ti, Xi, Ai = 1] = αDi + Z ′iδ + pi log Ti + E [ui | Di, Zi, Ti, Xi, Ai = 1]
(4.6)
By developing the expectation of the disturbance in equation (4.6), we arrive at:
E [ui | Di, Zi, Xi, Ti, Ai = 1] =
=
1∑
k=0
E [ui | Di, Zi, Xi, Ti, Aki = 1]Pr (Aki = 1 | Ai = 1, Di, Zi, Ti, Xi) (4.7)
By using the definitions in equation (4.5) and the distribution function described in
equation (4.1), we obtain that the probability terms in equation (4.7) have the following
form:
Pr (Aki = 1 | Ai = 1, Di, Zi, Ti, Xi) =
= Pr(Aki = 1 | Ai = 1, Ti, Xi) = exp(X
′
iβk)
exp(X ′iβ0) + exp(X
′
iβ1)
(4.8)
13See Heckman (1976) and Chap. 10 in Amemiya (1985).
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The mean of the disturbance ui, conditional on all the explanatory variables and on
the indicator Aki taking the value of 1, has the following structure using equations (4.1),
(4.4) and (4.5):
E [ui | Di, Zi, Ti, Xi, Aki = 1] = (4.9)
=
1∑
j=0
ρjE
[
εji | Xi, Ti, εki − ε(1−k)i ≥ X ′i
(
β(1−k) − βk
)
, εki ≥ −X ′iβk
]
By developing both terms included in equation (4.9) and replacing equations (4.8)
and (4.9) into equation (4.7), we obtain the following expression of the self-selection
bias:
E [ui | Di, Zi, Ti, Xi, Ai = 1] =
= ρ0
(
1 +
∑1
k=0 exp (X
′
iβk)
)
(1 + exp (X ′iβ1))
[∑1
k=0 exp (X
′
iβk)
]{ln [1 + exp (X ′iβ0) + exp (X ′iβ1)]−
− X
′
iβ0 exp (X
′
iβ0)
1 +
∑1
k=0 exp (X
′
iβk)
}
+
+ρ1
(
1 +
∑1
k=0 exp (X
′
iβk)
)
(1 + exp (X ′iβ0))
[∑1
k=0 exp (X
′
iβk)
]{ln [1 + exp (X ′iβ0) + exp (X ′iβ1)]−
− X
′
iβ1 exp (X
′
iβ1)
1 +
∑1
k=0 exp (X
′
iβk)
}
(4.10)
Note that this bias expression takes into account that the logarithm of the un-
employment duration is endogeneous to reemployment wages. In order to control for
self-selection using an estimator similar to Heckman’s two-step estimator, the first stage
will consist of estimating the duration model described in Section 2. In a second stage,
I will compute estimates of those terms whose coefficients are ρ0 and ρ1 in the bias
expression shown in equation (4.10), replacing the unknown parameters βk by their es-
timates in the first stage; these terms are introduced in equation (4.6) and then this is
estimated by OLS robust to heteroskedasticity using only the subsample of individuals
entering an employment spell.
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Although this two-step estimator is consistent, this procedure does not provide effi-
cient estimates due to the fact that it does not take into account that predicted values
have been introduced in the estimates. In order to obtain more efficient estimates, I
estimate the unemployment duration model and the wage equation jointly using the
generalised method of moments (GMM).
For this purpose, I use two sets of orthogonality conditions: the former is formed by
the first-order conditions derived from the maximisation of the log-likelihood function
defined for the duration model, shown in equation (4.11):
E
[
∂Li(β)
∂βk
]
= 0, k = 1, 0 (4.11)
The latter set of orthogonality conditions arises from the first moment of the potential
wage distribution conditional on the subsample of unemployed individuals entering a job
spell, that is, conditional on Ai = 1 as in equation (4.6). This equation can be rewritten
as follows:
wi = αDi + Z
′
iδ + pi log Ti + ρ1µ1i(Xi; β) + ρ0µ0i(Xi; β) + ξi
The expression ρ1µ1i(Xi; β)+ρ0µ0i(Xi; β) denotes the self-selection bias displayed in
equation (4.10), which depends on the parameter vector, β, coming from the transition
intensities to employment. The noise ξi is an error term coming from the regression of
the logarithm of wage, wi, on the explanatory variables Di, Zi, log Ti, µ1i(Xi; β) and
µ0i(Xi; β) from the subsample of individuals entering a job spell. Thus, this prediction
error is mean independent of the regressors:
E [ξi | Di, Zi, log Ti, µ1i(Xi; β), µ0i(Xi; β)] = 0
38
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     46     DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
This kind of independence implies the second set of orthogonality conditions shown
in equation (4.12):
E


Di
Zi
(log Ti)
µ1i(Xi; β)
µ0i(Xi; β)

ξi

= 0 (4.12)
Let Xi and Zi be matrices of dimension p × 1 and r × 1, respectively. The number
of parameters to be estimated from both the duration model and the wage equation is
2p+ r+4, corresponding to β1, β0, δ, α, pi, ρ0 and ρ1. As the number of parameters is
equal to the number of orthogonality conditions, the parameters are exactly identified.
Therefore, the choice of the weighting matrix, AN , becomes irrelevant in the following
criterion function:
min
{β,δ,α,pi,ρ1,ρ0}
bN (β, δ, α, pi, ρ1, ρ0)
′ANbN (β, δ, α, pi, ρ1, ρ0)
bN (β, δ, α, pi, ρ1, ρ0) =

1
N
∑N
i=1
∂Li(β)
∂β
1
N
∑N
i=1

Di
Zi
(log Ti)
µ1i(Xi; β)
µ0i(Xi; β)

ξi

ξi = wi − αDi − Z ′iδ − pi log Ti − ρ1µ1i(Xi; β)− ρ0µ0i(Xi; β)
AN = I(2p+r+4)
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This optimisation problem has been solved using the Newton-Rhapson method and
taking the two-step estimates as initial values.
Finally, the wage equation estimates have not been corrected using the panel data
techniques described by Arellano and Honore´ (2001), in order to take into account the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the explanatory variables. The
reason is that I cannot apply first differences to the wage equation to remove the fixed
effect, since most explanatory variables are time invariant, and their coefficients will not
be identified.
4.2 Estimation results
The vector of explanatory variables, Zi, includes new-job and personal character-
istics. First, country indicators are introduced except for Spain. Concerning new-job
characteristics, I use an indicator of whether the working time is full-time, and firm size
indicators, in which a firm is small if the number of workers is lower than 100, medium if
this number ranges from 100 to 499 workers, and large if the number of workers is larger
than 500. I also include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs
to the private sector, and indicators of the firm’s economic activity according to the
two-digit NACE, in which the omitted category is A+B+C+E, corresponding to the
primary sector, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply.
I consider the following personal characteristics: the logarithms of the unemployment
spell duration and the age, the indicator of whether the individual is male, and dummy
variables indicating the level of education, using the level lower than the second stage of
secondary education as the omitted category. Finally, I include the indicator of whether
the exit to employment is associated with a residential change, as defined in Section 2.
Table A.5 shows some descriptive statistics of the average monthly earnings (adjusted
by the Purchasing Power Parities, PPP) that the household heads obtain after leaving
unemployment, according to their job and personal characteristics. We can see that
the median of the average monthly earnings are higher among household heads having
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found a full-time job and working in the public sector. The higher the education level
and the larger the firm size are, the higher the median of the average monthly earnings
that individuals obtain after leaving unemployment and the larger the wage dispersion
(measured by the interquartile range) are. Moreover, both the younger and the older
people are, the lower the earnings they can achieve. It also seems to exist a big difference
in the level and dispersion of the earnings obtained by male and female household heads
that enter a job spell. Furthermore, post-unemployment wages seem to decrease when
the family heads have been unemployed for more than 18 months, and exits to a job
spell related to geographical mobility are associated with both lower levels and greater
dispersion of earnings.
Table 5 shows the estimation results. Specification (i) is estimated by OLS robust
to heteroskedasticity, and the other two specifications take into account the possible
presence of a self-selection bias by including the two terms, µ0i (Xi; β) and µ1i (Xi; β),
which are associated with coefficients ρ0 and ρ1, respectively, in equation (4.10).
Column (ii) shows the results of the two-step estimator implied by the unemployment
duration model with two alternative exits to employment, and column (iii) the GMM
joint estimates of the wage equation and the duration model.
After applying a series of filters to the data, constructing the unemployment duration
variable and assigning the explanatory variables to each duration, I obtain a number
of 2, 150 spells for these five countries, in which the proportion of complete spells is
64.65%. Thus, I should have a total of 1, 390 wage observations of individuals exiting
to employment. However, I can only assign a wage to 800 spells, which represent the
57.55% of the complete unemployment spells.14
The estimates of the three specifications are very similar in the coefficients size and
the significance of the explanatory variables. It seems not to exist big wage differences
14We cannot assign a reemployment wage to those individuals that have worked in two or more
different jobs in the same year (in more than two jobs as employees or in more than two jobs self-
employed), since we use both the annual total wage and salary earnings and self-employment income
for obtaining a monthly average reemployment wage. We cannot identify the reemployment wage, as
we cannot distiguish how much income was obtained in each job. See the Appendix for further details.
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across countries after having allowed for job and personal characteristics. In specifi-
cation (iii), the logarithm of the duration has an estimated coefficient of −0.032, with
the expected sign, but it is insignificant. This may be due to two reasons: first, the
reduced sample size and the high proportion of right-censored spells make duration de-
pendence be not estimated accurately. Second, this sample only consists of entrants
into unemployment that are followed for a short time period, for nearly a year for most
of them (81.86% of the observations); so, the sample has very short durations without
enough variation to capture dependence on wages.
Regarding geographical mobility, the coefficient estimate of the residential change
indicator is negative in all specifications, but insignificant. This may be caused by the
small sample size and the tiny frequency of residential mobility. In addition, the exis-
tence of opposite effects can make this coefficient be biased toward zero, as commented
at the beginning of this section.
Concerning personal and job characteristics, most of them are significant and have
the expected effects. The logarithm of age has a positive effect on post-unemployment
wages; this variable captures the influence of the labour market experience on wages.
The education indicators are also significant at the 1% level in explaining the post-
unemployment wages as expected.
Another expected result is that individuals working full-time earn on average a higher
monthly wage than those working part-time; however, wage differences are not observed
among individuals working in the private and public sectors. With respect to the firm
size, individuals working in medium firms are paid higher wages than those in small firms,
since its coefficient estimate in specification (iii) is 0.277, significant at the 1% level.
Although the effect of large firm size is positive, it is not significant. I tried to include
interactions of the firm size with the level of education in order to capture different
ways of firms’ remuneration for the level of education according to their size. That is,
individuals having a low level of education may earn similar wages independently of the
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firm size, small or large; however, high-skilled individuals are expected to be better-paid
in large firms than in small firms. Nevertheless, these interactions are not significant, and
they are finally removed from the estimates. As unemployment is expected to affect low-
skilled individuals more seriously, the composition of the sample of post-unemployment
wages makes this education effect difficult to identify. The lowest-educated workers
account for the 69.88% of the sample.
Concerning firm’s or unit’s economic activity, sectors like education (M); transport,
storage and communication (I); hotels and restaurants (H); real state, renting and busi-
ness activities (K); and wholesale and retail trade (G) pay relatively more than the
omitted category does, (A+B+C+E). Appendix A details the correspondence of this
code with the economic activity.
Finally, the coefficient estimates of the terms allowing for the self-selection bias, ρ1
and ρ0, are 0.050 and 0.045, respectively, but they are not significant. Both values
would be consistent with the idea that wages and exits to a job spell are positively
correlated. The unemployed workers may refuse wage offers that are very low, under
their reservation wage. So, the mean of the accepted wage distribution seems to be
higher than that of the potential wage distribution.15
15The two terms that controls for the self-selection bias, µ0i (Xi;β) and µ1i (Xi;β), always take
positive values in the sample of wages.
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5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to study three questions: first, how housing tenure, owner-
ship or rental, influences the unemployed workers’ geographical mobility decision using
a discrete model of unemployment duration with two alternative exits to employment,
depending on whether they are associated with a residential change or not; these transi-
tion intensities follow a multinomial logit specification. Second, I address the potential
endogeneity of the ownership status to the transition intensities. I investigate the main
determinants of the housing tenure status, taking into account the differences in the
policies supporting the access to a dwelling across countries. The ownership status
equation is used to estimate the unemployment duration model allowing for unobserved
heterogeneity. Third, I study the main characteristics affecting the wage that individ-
uals obtain just after leaving unemployment. Particularly, I try to find out whether the
unemployment duration affects wages negatively, and whether the unemployed workers
who exit to a job spell associated with a residential change have higher wages than those
who find a job in their local area.
For this purpose, I use individual data from the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP) for five waves covering the period 1994-98. As the surveys are homoge-
neous across countries, I use a pooling of countries to make comparisons among them.
The sample in all estimates consists of unemployment spells of family heads aged
25 to 64 years old, having previous labour market experience, and coming from one
of the following European countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom. An important limitation to study geographical mobility using the ECHP
is the impossibility of differentiating geographical mobility from residential mobility
perfectly. I can only know that the residential changes occur within the same province,
from other province within the same country and from other country. Due to the limited
number of inter-regional movements observed in all European countries, I identify a
case of geographical mobility as a residential change that occurred at some point of the
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unemployment spell or that was preceded by an exit to employment two months ago, at
most. In spite of this problem, I use the ECHP survey, since this is the only fixed panel
available in some of these countries for studying issues of housing tenure, residential
mobility and labour mobility. I have obtained the following results: concerning the
effect of housing tenure on labour mobility, I find that homeowners and renters living
in social housing are more reluctant to accept a job associated with a residential change
than private renters, since they have large negative coefficient estimates, and they are
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. On the contrary, housing tenure does
not affect the unemployed workers’ behaviour in the local labour market; that is, the
reservation wage for accepting job offers coming from their local area is not altered
by the type of housing tenure. However, owners having outstanding mortgages leave
unemployment in their local area with a higher probability; this type of owners seems
to search for a job more intensively, since they have to face outstanding debts. Finally,
concerning the probabilities predicted by the model, we can see that the unemployed
workers’ geographical mobility is very reduced in all countries.
With respect to the main determinants of the housing tenure status, the age profile of
the home ownership is similar to that predicted by the life-cycle theory: when individuals
are younger, they have a higher probability of living in a rented house; when they have
accumulated enough wealth to invest in an owned house, they switch from rental to
home ownership, and finally when they are older, the proportion of individuals living in
an owned house starts to fall. The household income affects the probability of being an
owner positively. Housing markets in Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy make home
ownership more attractive than private rental, in comparison with those in Germany and
France. When country indicators are replaced by other indicators evaluating housing
policies that encourage home ownership, this status is observed to respond negatively
to the importance of the stamp duties incurred in the purchase of a dwelling, and the
ratio social to private rented accommodation, and positively to the existence of interest
tax-reliefs on income taxes.
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When we make the ownership status endogenous to transitions to employment due
to the presence of unobserved human capital or other factors, such as the idea of rental
as a temporary housing tenure regime for those individuals who expect to move in the
near future, the results are reinforced. The ownership coefficient in exits associated
with a residential change becomes more negative and significant. The value of the log-
likelihood function does not increase so much when unobserved heterogeneity is specified
as a discrete variable with a finite support of more than two mass points. Finally, the
average monthly wage that individuals obtain just after leaving unemployment depends
on personal and job characteristics in the way expected, except for the indicators of large
firm size and the private sector, since neither are significant. In order to estimate the
mean of the potential wage distribution, we have to control for the possible presence of a
self-selection bias. This arises due to the fact that a subsample of individuals decides to
remain unemployed; they reject all wage offers being lower than their reservation wage.
The corrections are similar to Heckman’s two-step estimator, but they are derived from
the duration model with multinomial logit transitions to employment. As this two-step
estimator does not take into account the inclusion of predicted regressors, I estimate the
wage equation jointly with the unemployment duration model of multiple employment
exits by GMM, in order to obtain more efficient estimates. However, due to the small
sample size of post-unemployment wages, the effect of the length of the unemployment
spell and the geographical mobility are not captured accurately.
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Appendix: Database description
A Personal and household characteristics
The data come from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the
period 1994-98, and they are provided by Eurostat.
Sample: is formed by family heads aged 25 to 64 years old, who do not satisfy any of
the following characteristics:
• Full-time or part-time employed, self-employed, retired, staying in paid ap-
prenticeship or training under special schemes relative to employment, unpaid
work in a family enterprise, education or training, community or military ser-
vice, and other economically inactivity different from doing housework and
looking after children or other persons; not having previous experience in a
job, and living in rent-free accommodation.
• Missing observations in the following variables: age, gender, cohabitation in a
relation, lack of personal information on the spouse or the partner, education,
household composition, year of the move to the address, housing tenure and
where individuals move from.
Duration: the sample consists of entrants into unemployment. The durations are
constructed using the indicators of the individuals’ main economic activity carried
out in each month of the year prior to the survey. These durations can start in
any month from January 1994 to December 1997.
Experience: is constructed by using the indicators of the main economic activity from
January 1993 to December 1997 and summing the months for which individuals
are employed. When individuals are employed in January 1993, the experience
variable is completed by multiplying 12 by the number of years worked at the
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current job in January 1993. This number is obtained through the variable of year
of the start of the current job.
Previous job economic sector and working time; post-unemployment job working time,
firm’s size, firm’s business sector (whether private or public) and two-digit NACE
economic activity: are constructed by matching the information available for the
current and last jobs in each wave of the survey, according to the year and the
month in which the individual starts and finishes to work in both the job previous
to an unemployment spell and the post-unemployment job.
Education: is the highest level of education completed, broken down by three categories:
recognised third level of education (ISCED 5-7), second stage of secondary level of
education (ISCED 3), and less than second stage of secondary education (ISCED
0-2).
Income: is the logarithm of the household income received in the previous year. Income
is made homogeneous across countries using the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).
Indicator of a residential change during the unemployment spell: is constructed using
information on the year and the month in which the individual starts to live at
the current address, and using information on where the previous dwelling was
located.
Housing tenure: Three types of housing tenure are considered: home ownership, private
rental and subsidised rental (the accommodation is rented from a public, muni-
cipal, voluntary, or non-profit agency or from a household member’s employer).
Rent-free accommodation is left out of the sample.
Average monthly wage: is constructed using information on the total net income from
work, earned in the year prior to the survey (wage and salary earnings or self-
employment income), and the indicators of the main economic activity done in
each month of the year prior to the survey.
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Two-digit NACE economic activity: A+B+C+E denotes primary sector, mining and
quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply; DA manufacture of food products,
beverages and tobacco; DB+DC manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather
products; DD+DE manufacture of wood and paper products, publishing and print-
ing; DF-DI manufacture of coke, refined petroleum/chemicals/rubber and plastic
products, etc.; DJ-DK manufacture of metal products, machinery and equipment
n.e.c.; DL-DN other manufacturing; F construction; G wholesale and retail trade,
repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal/household goods; H hotels and
restaurants; I transport, storage and communication; J financial intermediation;
K real state, renting and business activities; L public administration and defense,
compulsory social security; M education; N health and social work; O-Q other com-
munity, social and personal service activities, private households with employed
persons, extra-territorial organisations and bodies.
B Aggregate variables
Purchasing Power Parity: is provided by Eurostat for the period covered by the survey.
Quarterly national unemployment rates: come from the Main Economic Indicators
from the OECD.
Economic indices: the index of the strictness of the employment protection legislation
(EPL) is extracted from the OECD Employment Outlook, June (1999). The per-
centages of transaction costs and the stamp duties incurred in the purchase of a
house on the house price, the indicator of the existence of an interest tax-relief on
income taxes, and the ratio social to private rented accommodation are extracted
from Maclennan et al. (1998).
Ln(transaction tax(%)): is constructed as
ln (transaction tax (%)) = ln
(
transaction taxes
house price
· 100
)
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA     57   DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
EPL strictness: this index takes a value of the range from 0 to 6, and the higher
it is, the stricter the employment protection legislation. The logarithm of
this index is introduced in the estimation.
Ln(stamp duty): is defined as
ln (stamp duty) = ln
(
stamp duty
house price
· 100
)
Ln(ratio social to private rented housing): is constructed as
ln (ratio social to private rented housing) = ln
(
social rented housing stock
private rented housing stock
)
Concerning regular employment, the index of EPL strictness reflects regular pro-
cedural inconveniences to the employer for the dismissal, such as the notice period
and other procedures; severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals; difficulty in
the dismissal, such as the definition of unfair dismissal; trial period before eligibil-
ity arises; unfair dismissal compensation; etc. With respect to temporary employ-
ment, this index captures the strictness in the conditions under which fixed-term
contracts may be used, such as specific projects, seasonal work, replacement of
temporarily absent permanent workers (sickness, maternity leave) and exceptional
workload; the maximum number of successive contracts; the maximum cumulated
duration; and the regulation of temporary work agencies (TWAs) (types of work
for which TWA employment is legal, restrictions on the number of renewals and
maximum cumulated duration of temporary work contracts). Regarding the regu-
lation of collective dismissals, the index of strictness evaluates their definition, the
additional notification requirements to employee representatives and to govern-
ment authorities, additional delays involved and other special costs to employers
(severance pay and social compensation plans).
50
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     58    DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
References
Addison, J. T. and Portugal, P. (1989), “Job Displacement, Relative Wage Changes,
and Duration of Unemployment”, Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 7, no. 3,
281-302.
Amemiya, T. (1985), Advanced Econometrics, Basil Blackwell.
Antol´ın, P. and Bover, O. (1997), “Regional migration in Spain: the effect of per-
sonal characteristics and of unemployment, wage and house price differentials using
pooled cross-sections”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 59(2), 1997.
Arellano, M. and Honore´, B. (2001), “Panel Data Models: Some Recent Develop-
ments”, Edited by: J. J. Heckman and E. Leamer, Handbook of Econometrics ,
volumen 5, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 3229-3296.
Barcelo´, C. (2003), “Housing Tenure and Labour Mobility: A Comparison across Euro-
pean Countries”, CEMFI Working Paper No. 0302.
Barcelo´, C. (2005), “Modelling Housing Tenure and Labour Mobility: An Empirical
Investigation”, Banco de Espan˜a, mimeo.
Bentolila, S. and Dolado, J. J. (1991), “Mismatch and internal migration in Spain,
1962-1986”, in F. Padoa Schioppa, ed., Mismatch and Labour Mobility, Cambridge
University Press, pp. 182-234.
Bentolila, S. (1997), “Sticky Labor in Spanish Regions”, European Economic Review,
41, 591-598.
Bentolila, S. and Jimeno, J. F. (1998), “Regional unemployment persistence (Spain,
1976-1994)”, Labour Economics, 5(1), 1998.
Bo¨heim, R. and M. P. Taylor (1999), “Residential Mobility, Housing Tenure and the
Labour Market in Britain”, ILR Working Paper No. 35, University of Essex.
51
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     59    DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
Bover, O., Bentolila, S. and Arellano, M. (2002), “The distribution of earnings in
Spain during the 1980s: The effects of skill, unemployment, and union power”,
The Economics of Rising Inequalities, D. Cohen, T. Piketty and Gilles Saint-Paul
(eds.), Oxford University Press, pp. 3-53.
Bover, O., Arellano, M. and Bentolila, S. (2002), “Unemployment Duration, Benefit
Duration, and the Business Cycle”, The Economic Journal, 112, pp. 223-265.
Bover, O. and Go´mez, R. (2004), “Another look at unemployment duration: exit to
a permanent vs. a temporary job”, Investigaciones Econo´micas , 28(2), pp. 285-
314.
Deaton, A. (1998), “Getting Prices Right: What Should be Done?”, The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 12(1), pp. 37-46.
Duce Tello, R. M. (1995), “Un modelo de eleccio´n de tenencia de vivienda para
Espan˜a”, Moneda y Cre´dito, 201, pp. 129-152.
Ham, J. C., and LaLonde, R., J. (1996), “The effect of sample selection and initial
conditions in duration models: evidence from experimental data on training”,
Econometrica, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 175-205.
Heckman, J. J. (1976), “The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation,
Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for
Such Models”, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5, pp. 475-492.
Heckman, J. J., and Singer, B. (1984), “A method for minimising the impact of distri-
butional assumptions in econometric models of duration data”, Econometrica, 52,
pp. 271-230.
Henley, A. (1998), “Residential mobility, housing equity and the labour market”, The
Economic Journal, 108, pp. 414-427.
52
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     60    DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
Hughes, G., and McCormick, B. (1981), “Do council house policies reduce migration
between regions”, The Economic Journal, vol. 91, pp. 919-37.
Hughes, G., and McCormick, B. (1994), “Did migration in the 1980s narrow the North-
South divide?”, Economica, vol. 61, pp. 509-27.
King, M. A. (1980), “An Econometric Model of Tenure Choice and Demand for Housing
as a Joint Decision”, Journal of Public Economics, 14, pp. 137-159.
Lancaster, T. (1990), The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge.
van Leuvensteijn, M. and P. Koning (2004), “The effect of home-ownership on labor
mobility in the Netherlands”, Journal of Urban Economics, 55(3), pp. 580-596.
Maclennan, D., Muellbauer, J., and Stephens, M. (1998), “Asymmetries in Housing
and Financial Market Institutions and EMU”, The Oxford Review of Economic
Policy, 14:3, Autumn 1998.
McCormick, B. (1997), “Regional Unemployment and Labour Mobility in the UK”,
European Economic Review, 41, 581-589.
Meghir, C. and Whitehouse, E. (1997), “Labour market transitions and retirement of
men in the UK”, Journal of Econometrics, 79, pp. 327-354.
Meyer, B. (1990), “Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells”, Econometrica,
58, 757-782.
Mroz, T. (1987), “The Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of Married Women’s Hours of
Work to Economic and Statistical Assumptions”, Econometrica, 55(4), 765-799.
Pissarides, C. A., and Wadsworth, J. (1989), “Unemployment and the inter-regional
mobility of labour”, The Economic Journal, vol. 99, pp.739-55.
53
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     61   DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
OECD (1994), “Unemployment and related welfare benefits”, The OECD Jobs Study.
Evidence and Explanations. Part II The Adjustment Potential of the Labour Mar-
ket, pp. 171-237.
OECD (1999), OECD Employment Outlook, Publications Service, Paris.
54
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     62    DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0603 
Table A.1: Percentage of housing tenure and geographical mobility in the sample of
unemployment spells.
Housing tenure Geographical Percentage of Sample
Ownership Rental mobility rate unemployment spells period
Germany 36.00 64.00 2.00 6.98 1994-96
France 36.59 63.41 2.51 16.65 1994-98
United Kingdom 57.42 42.58 0.65 7.21 1994-96
Italy 68.94 31.06 1.24 22.47 1994-98
Spain 82.57 17.43 1.89 46.70 1994-98
Table A.2: Individual characteristics in the sample of unemployment spells.
No geographical Geographical
mobility mobility
Housing tenure
Ownership without outstanding mortgage 43.94 23.68
Ownership with outstanding mortgage 23.58 2.63
Private rental 20.08 60.53
Social rental 12.41 13.16
Education
Third level 8.29 5.26
2nd level secondary 23.58 39.47
Less than 2nd level secondary 68.13 55.26
Living with a partner
No 19.79 26.32
Spouse/partner employed 29.36 15.79
Spouse/partner not employed 50.85 57.89
Gender
Male 85.84 86.84
Female 14.16 13.16
Children aged
[0, 6] years old 29.69 42.11
[7, 11] years old 25.24 23.68
[12, 18] years old 33.95 34.21
Economic sector
Agriculture 12.78 5.26
Industry 19.70 18.42
Services 44.84 55.26
Construction 22.68 21.05
Experience at previous job
≤ 12 months 58.10 71.05
[13, 24] months 13.64 10.53
[25, 36] months 5.59 2.63
> 36 months 22.68 15.79
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Table A.3: Duration frequencies in entrants into unemployment.
Total Germany France United Kingdom Italy Spain
Censored 35.35 70.67 33.52 59.35 27.95 30.58
Completed 64.65 29.33 66.48 40.65 72.05 69.42
No. of spells 2,150 150 358 155 483 1,004
Duration of the Duration of the
unemployment spell Percentage unemployment spell Percentage
1 month 15.53 25 months 0.37
2 months 15.02 26 months 0.37
3 months 11.35 27 months 0.56
4 months 7.02 28 months 0.37
5 months 5.86 29 months 0.28
6 months 6.65 30 months 0.23
7 months 3.35 31 months 0.37
8 months 3.63 32 months 0.09
9 months 3.44 33 months 0.05
10 months 1.77 34 months 0.09
11 months 1.40 35 months 0.05
12 months 6.84 36 months 0.56
13 months 0.98 37 months 0.23
14 months 1.63 38 months 0.14
15 months 1.26 39 months 0.14
16 months 1.40 40 months 0.05
17 months 1.35 41 months 0.09
18 months 0.70 42 months 0.05
19 months 0.84 43 months 0.05
20 months 0.47 44 months 0.05
21 months 0.74 45 months 0.05
22 months 0.88 46 months 0.05
23 months 0.60 47 months 0.09
24 months 2.56 48 months 0.37
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Table A.4: Percentage of individuals exiting to a job spell broken down by the receipt
of unemployment benefits and the duration of the unemployment spell.
Completed spells (%) Completed spells (%)
Duration of the Unemployment No Duration of the Unemployment No
unemployment spell benefits benefits unemployment spell benefits benefits
1 month 11.09 14.58 25 months 0.00 3.28
2 months 13.34 12.05 26 months 4.88 0.00
3 months 11.21 10.57 27 months 8.57 5.88
4 months 9.00 9.35 28 months 0.00 2.17
5 months 8.55 8.08 29 months 4.00 2.44
6 months 12.90 8.81 30 months 0.00 10.00
7 months 8.09 4.52 31 months 5.26 8.33
8 months 8.58 7.22 32 months 6.67 3.13
9 months 6.34 6.69 33 months 0.00 0.00
10 months 4.95 4.15 34 months 0.00 3.33
11 months 4.18 2.59 35 months 0.00 0.00
12 months 10.06 10.04 36 months 0.00 3.33
13 months 3.08 3.07 37 months 0.00 4.55
14 months 5.74 3.13 38 months 20.00 5.26
15 months 2.72 1.33 39 months 0.00 5.56
16 months 4.88 3.50 40 months 0.00 0.00
17 months 6.90 3.03 41 months 0.00 7.14
18 months 1.60 2.44 42 months 0.00 8.33
19 months 3.51 2.52 43 months 0.00 0.00
20 months 3.92 0.00 44 months 0.00 0.00
21 months 5.32 1.80 45 months 0.00 0.00
22 months 4.94 3.70 46 months 0.00 0.00
23 months 5.33 1.05 47 months 0.00 0.00
24 months 10.94 9.68 48 months 0.00 0.00
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Table A.5: Average monthly earnings converted to equivalent units using the Purchasing
Power Parities (PPP).
Interquartile
Median Range 25% percentile 75% percentile
Countries:
Germany 945.65 760.40 620.73 1, 381.13
France 820.34 420.85 582.44 1, 003.30
United Kingdom 1, 095.00 880.09 693.26 1, 573.35
Italy 942.84 577.49 589.28 1, 166.77
Spain 874.62 444.77 652.34 1, 097.11
Job characteristics
Working time:
Full-time job 900.90 465.49 675.68 1, 141.16
Part-time job 555.97 362.73 406.50 769.23
Firm size:
Large 1, 076.37 732.64 745.54 1, 478.18
Medium 999.41 715.97 820.34 1, 536.31
Small 866.43 493.53 591.72 1, 085.25
Business sector:
Private 883.91 469.78 638.14 1, 107.92
Public 909.17 644.11 558.66 1, 202.77
Personal characteristics
Age bands:
[25, 29] 778.53 431.90 589.28 1, 021.17
[30, 44] 894.05 501.46 658.13 1, 159.59
[45, 64] 885.71 505.77 603.70 1, 109.47
Education:
Third level 1, 067.46 808.65 748.06 1, 556.71
2nd stage secondary 974.38 654.86 687.38 1, 342.24
Less than 2nd stage 843.02 470.33 580.72 1, 051.05
secondary
Sex:
Male 897.79 457.89 668.24 1, 126.13
Female 690.94 557.98 443.79 1, 001.77
Geographical mobility 817.59 702.50 596.63 1, 299.13
Local labour market 885.80 480.60 630.10 1, 110.70
Unemployment spell duration:
[1, 6] months 885.16 508.52 638.14 1, 146.66
[7, 12] months 885.71 421.70 638.99 1, 060.70
[13, 18] months 889.55 485.55 517.75 1, 003.30
> 18 months 838.32 486.35 512.13 998.49
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Table 1: Estimates of multinomial logit transition intensities to employment associated with a resi-
dential change (θ1) or not (θ0).
θk(t | Xi(t)) = exp(Xi(t)′βk)1+exp(Xi(t)′β0)+exp(Xi(t)′β1) ; k = 0, 1
(i) Country dummies (ii) Economic variables
θ1(t | Xi(t)) θ0(t | Xi(t)) θ1(t | Xi(t)) θ0(t | Xi(t))
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Country dummies
Germany −14.126 −3.42 −1.728 −2.37
France −9.956 −3.40 −0.625 −1.22
United Kingdom −17.474 −3.46 −1.604 −1.85
Italy −10.538 −3.50 −0.492 −0.93
Economic variables
Ln(transaction costs (%)) −0.299 −0.25 1.284 4.24
Ln(EPL strictness) 1.010 0.47 −1.651 −3.32
Ln(benefit replacement rate(%)) 0.260 0.58 −0.515 −4.68
Ln(unemployment rate) −16.607 −3.29 −1.209 −1.41 0.194 0.22 0.630 3.03
Housing characteristics
Housing tenure:
Ownership −1.805 −4.03 0.111 1.25 −1.617 −3.65 0.128 1.44
Social housing rental −1.177 −2.14 0.122 1.08 −1.092 −2.00 0.128 1.14
Outstanding mortgage −1.364 −1.28 0.343 4.26 −1.384 −1.30 0.343 4.26
Previous job characteristics
Economic sector:
Industry 0.220 0.42 −0.149 −1.74 0.305 0.60 −0.148 −1.73
Services 0.057 0.13 −0.242 −3.39 0.028 0.07 −0.245 −3.44
Working time:
Full-time job 0.228 0.36 0.155 1.38 0.230 0.36 0.156 1.39
Experience:
Ln(experience) 0.042 0.16 −0.166 −4.75 0.019 0.07 −0.169 −4.83
Ln(experience)*ln(duration) −0.138 −1.14 0.016 0.76 −0.144 −1.19 0.017 0.82
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Table 1: Estimates of multinomial logit transition intensities to employment associated with a resi-
dential change (θ1) or not (θ0). (Cont.)
θk(t | Xi(t)) = exp(Xi(t)′βk)1+exp(Xi(t)′β0)+exp(Xi(t)′β1) ; k = 0, 1
(i) Country dummies (ii) Economic variables
θ1(t | Xi(t)) θ0(t | Xi(t)) θ1(t | Xi(t)) θ0(t | Xi(t))
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Personal characteristics
Education:
Third level 1.122 0.90 0.508 2.68 1.045 0.86 0.506 2.67
Third level*ln(duration) −0.604 −0.77 −0.147 −1.28 −0.599 −0.80 −0.151 −1.32
2nd stage secondary 0.936 2.31 0.097 1.21 0.861 2.15 0.090 1.11
Ln(age) −0.716 −0.90 −0.791 −5.66 −0.688 −0.88 −0.784 −5.62
Male family head 0.555 0.89 0.326 2.95 0.680 1.10 0.329 2.98
Living with a partner −0.104 −0.18 0.045 0.44 −0.127 −0.22 0.048 0.47
Spouse/partner is employed −0.770 −1.58 −0.024 −0.33 −0.630 −1.31 −0.025 −0.34
No. of children aged [0, 18] 0.596 1.40 0.030 0.45 0.634 1.51 0.033 0.51
Squared no. of children aged [0, 18] −0.086 −0.83 −0.001 −0.05 −0.102 −1.00 −0.003 −0.15
Unemployment benefits receipt −0.136 −0.18 −0.157 −1.44 −0.171 −0.23 −0.170 −1.55
Benefits receipt*ln(duration) 0.024 0.07 0.209 3.27 0.004 0.01 0.212 3.32
Unemployment duration dependence
Ln(duration) 0.389 0.54 −0.079 −0.70 0.348 0.49 −0.087 −0.76
Ln2(duration) 0.013 0.08 −0.177 −5.49 0.027 0.16 −0.176 −5.45
Constant 47.925 3.06 4.827 1.79 −4.848 −1.37 −0.174 −0.26
Seasonal indicators
First quarter −0.942 −1.91 −0.328 −3.84 −1.245 −2.61 −0.373 −4.50
Second quarter −0.747 −1.62 −0.052 −0.63 −1.015 −2.28 −0.082 −1.01
Third quarter −1.211 −2.40 0.011 0.14 −1.350 −2.68 −0.020 −0.25
Log-likelihood -4,476.45 -4,484.91
Number of spells 2,150 2,150
Notes: Specification (i) includes country dummies in the estimates, and specification (ii) replaces these dummies by indices evaluating
characteristics of the housing and labour markets, particularly, the transaction costs in the purchase as % of the house price, the strictness
of the employment protection legislation (EPL) and the average of the unemployment benefit replacement rates by unemployment
duration and family circumstances across country.
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Table 2: Predicted probabilities (%) of multinomial logit transitions to employment.
Specification (i): Country dummies.
θk(t | Xi(t)) = exp (Xi(t)
′βk)
1 + exp (Xi(t)′β0) + exp (Xi(t)′β1)
; k = 0, 1
Transitions to a job spell associated with
Residential change (θ1) No residential change (θ0)
Reference person 0.64 11.80
Countries
Germany 0.89 6.33
France 1.77 13.60
United Kingdom 0.53 8.64
Italy 0.94 15.33
Ownership
Non outstanding loans 0.10 13.07
Outstanding mortgage 0.03 17.50
Social housing rental 0.20 13.18
Previous job characteristics
Economic sector
Agriculture/Construction 0.30 10.11
Services 0.33 8.11
Working time
Part-time job 0.52 10.29
Experience attained
12 months 0.59 10.81
18 months 0.55 10.26
24 months 0.53 9.89
51 months 0.48 8.97
Personal characteristics
Education
Third level 0.82 15.33
2nd stage secondary 1.60 12.72
Female family head 0.38 8.83
Age
25 years old 0.72 13.37
45 years old 0.50 8.86
55 years old 0.44 7.67
Living with a partner
Spouse/partner not employed 0.58 12.28
Spouse/partner employed 0.27 12.07
No. of children aged [0, 18] years old
1 child 1.06 12.05
2 children 1.47 12.29
3 children 1.73 12.53
Unemployment benefits receipt 0.57 13.25
Notes: The reference person is a male family head living in a private rented house
in Spain. He is single, aged 30 years old, does not have any children and his level of
education is lower than the second level of secondary. He has been unemployed for 4
months, has previously worked full-time in the industry for 6 months, and does not receive
any unemployment benefits. The unemployment rate is evaluated at its average level in
1995, and the seasonal indicators are set at the fourth quarter.
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Table 3: Logit estimates of determinants of the ownership status in the sample of
unemployment spells.
Pr(hi | Zi) = Pr(h∗i | Zi) [1− Pr(qi = 1 | Z2i)] , hi = h∗i , hi = 0, 1;
Pr(hi = 2 | Zi) = Pr(qi = 1 | Z2i);
(i)Country dummies (ii) Economic variables
Pr(h∗i = 1 | Zi) Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Countries
Germany −2.344 −9.27
France −1.814 −9.99
United Kingdom −0.450 −1.57
Italy −0.668 −4.22
Support for home ownership
Ln(stamp duty) −0.975 −6.64
Interest tax relief 2.076 7.63
Ln(ratio social to private −0.697 −9.31
rented housing)
Household characteristics
Ln(total income (PPP)) 0.371 4.41 0.359 4.34
Ln(family head’s age) 3.102 11.01 3.116 11.07
Male family head 0.061 0.32 0.053 0.27
Living with a partner 0.609 3.29 0.627 3.41
No. children aged [0, 18] years old 0.241 1.68 0.236 1.64
Squared no. children aged [0, 18] −0.072 −1.91 −0.071 −1.88
Family head’s education:
Third level −0.090 −0.39 −0.111 −0.49
2nd stage secondary 0.230 1.45 0.222 1.40
Constant −13.707 −10.98 −15.556 −11.75
Log-likelihood -837.90 -838.25
Number of spells 1883 1883
Pr(qi = 1 | Z2i)
Countries
Germany 2.106 7.56
France 2.291 10.67
United Kingdom 2.473 9.68
Italy 1.136 5.05
Household characteristics
Ln(total income (PPP)) −0.247 −2.42
Ln(family head’s age) −1.651 −5.04
No. children aged [0, 18] years old 0.381 2.68
Squared no. children aged [0, 18] 0.001 0.02
Constant 4.573 3.20
Log-likelihood -664.41
Number of spells 2,150
Notes: In specification (i), the tenure status equation is estimated by controlling the
institutional differences across countries through the inclusion of country dummies, and,
in specification (ii), through three indicators evaluating the support for home ownership.
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Table 4: Joint estimates of multinomial transitions to employment with the ownership
status equation controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
θk [t | Xi(t), hi, ηi] = exp(Xi(t)
′βk + hiβhk + αkηi)
1 +
∑1
j=0 exp(Xi(t)′βj + hiβhj + αjηi)
, k = 0, 1;
θ1(t | Xi(t)) θ0(t | Xi(t))
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Country dummies
Germany −14.406 −3.34 −1.543 −2.09
France −10.145 −3.33 −0.498 −0.96
United Kingdom −17.662 −3.43 −1.529 −1.76
Italy −10.664 −3.46 −0.430 −0.81
Economic variables
Ln(unemployment rate) −16.787 −3.26 −1.126 −1.31
Housing characteristics
Housing tenure:
Ownership −2.066 −2.79 0.600 2.21
Social housing rental −1.318 −2.04 0.426 2.18
Outstanding mortgage −1.353 −1.27 0.327 4.01
Previous job characteristics
Economic sector:
Industry 0.207 0.40 −0.150 −1.74
Services 0.060 0.14 −0.245 −3.40
Working time:
Full-time job 0.245 0.39 0.141 1.23
Experience:
Ln(experience) 0.037 0.14 −0.164 −4.67
Ln(experience)*ln(duration) −0.134 −1.10 0.013 0.64
Personal characteristics
Education:
Third level 1.075 0.86 0.547 2.85
Third level*ln(duration) −0.602 −0.77 −0.153 −1.33
2nd stage secondary 0.934 2.30 0.097 1.19
Ln(age) −0.577 −0.69 −0.902 −5.93
Male family head 0.578 0.92 0.312 2.79
Living with a partner −0.112 −0.20 0.045 0.43
Spouse/partner is employed −0.739 −1.50 −0.045 −0.60
No. of children aged [0, 18] 0.623 1.46 0.009 0.13
Squared no. of children aged [0, 18] −0.091 −0.87 0.004 0.22
Unemployment benefits receipt −0.111 −0.15 −0.172 −1.56
Benefits receipt*ln(duration) 0.013 0.04 0.212 3.30
Unemployment duration dependence
Ln(duration) 0.372 0.52 −0.063 −0.55
Ln2(duration) 0.015 0.09 −0.179 −5.51
Constant 48.127 3.05 4.631 1.71
Seasonal indicators
First quarter −0.937 −1.90 −0.332 −3.87
Second quarter −0.744 −1.61 −0.054 −0.65
Third quarter −1.211 −2.40 0.007 0.08
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Table 4: Joint estimates of multinomial transitions to employment with the ownership
status equation controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. (Cont.)
Pr(hi | Zi, ηi) = Pr(h∗i | Zi, ηi) [1− Pr(qi = 1 | Z2i)] , hi = h∗i , hi = 0, 1;
Pr(hi = 2 | Zi, ηi) = Pr(qi = 1 | Z2i);
Housing tenure status: Coefficient t-ratio
Pr(h∗i = 1 | Zi, ηi)
Support for home ownership
Ln(stamp duty) −3.232 −6.60
Interest tax relief 5.916 8.02
Ln(ratio social to private −1.455 −6.04
rented housing)
Household characteristics
Ln(total income (PPP)) 1.184 6.28
Ln(family head’s age) 6.022 7.25
Male family head 0.750 1.88
Living with a partner 0.859 2.08
No. children aged [0, 18] years old 0.570 1.67
Squared no. children aged [0, 18] −0.167 −1.98
Family head’s education:
Third level −1.325 −2.55
2nd stage secondary −0.174 −0.45
Constant −34.130 −8.99
Pr(qi = 1 | Z2i)
Countries
Germany 2.106 7.56
France 2.291 10.67
United Kingdom 2.473 9.68
Italy 1.136 5.05
Household characteristics
Ln(total income (PPP)) −0.247 −2.42
Ln(family head’s age) −1.651 −5.04
No. children aged [0, 18] years old 0.381 2.68
Squared no. children aged [0, 18] 0.001 0.02
Constant 4.573 3.20
Unobserved heterogeneity parameters:
α0 −1.944 −0.42
α1 1.000
α 27.029 0.43
m1 0.059 0.43
m2 −0.247
p1 0.807 47.21
Number of individuals 1,459
Number of spells 2,150
Log-likelihood -5,806.10
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Table 5: Estimates of a wage equation from a sample of individuals just after leaving
unemployment.
wi = αDi + Z
′
iδ + pi log Ti + ρ0µ0(Xi; β) + ρ1µ1(Xi; β) + ξi for ci = 1
(i) OLS (ii) Two-step (iii) GMM joint
estimates estimates estimates
Countries
Germany 0.005 ( 0.05) −0.077 ( -0.58) −0.042 ( -0.31)
France −0.080 ( -1.24) −0.074 ( -1.15) −0.080 ( -1.25)
United Kingdom −0.127 ( -0.70) −0.165 ( -0.89) −0.148 ( -0.80)
Italy −0.031 ( -0.49) −0.023 ( -0.36) −0.028 ( -0.44)
Job characteristics
Working time:
Full-time job 0.457 ( 5.22) 0.466 ( 5.24) 0.462 ( 5.32)
Firm size:
Medium 0.272 ( 3.98) 0.282 ( 4.08) 0.277 ( 4.07)
Large 0.209 ( 1.55) 0.205 ( 1.52) 0.207 ( 1.57)
Private sector −0.102 ( -1.22) −0.125 ( -1.46) −0.113 ( -1.35)
Personal characteristics
Logarithm of age 0.241 ( 2.32) 0.158 ( 1.28) 0.206 ( 1.72)
Education:
Third level 0.309 ( 3.75) 0.332 ( 3.90) 0.321 ( 3.82)
2nd stage secondary 0.229 ( 3.56) 0.232 ( 3.55) 0.230 ( 3.54)
Male 0.229 ( 3.23) 0.267 ( 3.71) 0.249 ( 3.47)
Ln(unemployment duration) 0.017 ( 0.66) −0.028 ( -0.74) −0.003 ( -0.08)
Residential change −0.019 ( -0.11) −0.032 ( -0.18) −0.028 ( -0.16)
Constant 4.913 ( 11.20) 4.875 ( 10.34) 4.871 ( 10.41)
ρ0 0.100 ( 1.35) 0.045 ( 0.62)
ρ1 0.088 ( 0.63) 0.050 ( 0.32)
R2 0.16
No. of observations 800 2,150 2,150
Notes: These specifications include industry dummies NACE-2 classification. See Ap-
pendix A.
The specification (i) is estimated by OLS robust to heteroskedasticity.
The specification (ii) is also estimated by OLS robust to heteroskedasticity, and it con-
trols for the presence of self-selection bias using a two-step estimator similar to Heckman’s
lambda.
In columns (i) and (ii), both participation equations arise from specification (i) of the
duration model with two multinomial logit transitions to employment, shown in Table 1.
Column (iii) shows joint estimates using the generalised method of moments (GMM).
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the family head’s age according to the housing tenure.
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of the logarithm of the household’s total income according to the housing tenure.
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